Hackers Abuse Private APN to Pivot From Wind Farm Into Polish CHP Plant and Shut Down Turbine

Attackers abused a misconfigured private mobile APN network to move from a wind farm environment into the operational technology (OT) network of a Polish combined heat and power (CHP) plant, shutting down a steam turbine and water treatment systems.

The incident, investigated by CERT Polska, began with access to a wind farm network and later expanded through a private Access Point Name (APN) network used by the distribution system operator.

The private APN allowed connected devices to communicate with each other, creating an unexpected route into another critical energy environment.

The attackers first accessed a perimeter device at the wind farm and established a remote VPN connection.

They then identified a Teltonika RUTX50 cellular router, accessed its web management interface, and logged in to its SSH service. The SSH access was used to create a tunnel into the private APN.

Recovered logs indicating successful SSH logins to the Teltonika cellular router (Source: cert)
Recovered logs indicating successful SSH logins to the Teltonika cellular router (Source: cert)

Beginning on December 18, 2025, the threat actors scanned the APN for exposed VNC, HTTP, S7, and Modbus services. During this activity, they found a WAGO PFC200 controller connected to the CHP plant.

Its WAN-facing web administration interface was reachable from the APN and still used the default credentials for the admin account.

The attackers logged into the WAGO web interface and likely enabled SSH access on its WAN interface. They then used SSH tunneling to reach the CHP plant’s OT network.

The controller had connectivity to SCADA systems and industrial network segments managing important plant processes.

APN Hackers Halt Turbine

Between December 18 and December 25, the attackers mapped the CHP environment and attempted to expand access. One early target was a device acting as both a firewall and VPN gateway.

The attackers tried usernames including admin, user, and an account linked to a company that deployed telecontrol systems at renewable energy facilities. These login attempts failed.

The attackers then scanned internal network ranges for industrial and remote-access services.

The scan included Siemens S7 on TCP port 102, Modbus on port 502, CODESYS on port 11740, RTSP video services on port 554, RDP, VNC, HTTP, and HTTPS.

Attack Path from the Wind Farm to the Combined Heat and Power Plant (Source: cert)
Attack Path from the Wind Farm to the Combined Heat and Power Plant (Source: cert)

Investigators found that scanning in one subnet began with the IP address of a SCADA system, suggesting that the attackers may already have identified high-value assets.

On December 22, they also attempted connections to two systems running remote desktop services, likely while searching for usable credentials.

On Christmas Day, December 25, the attackers successfully connected to three Siemens programmable logic controllers (PLCs) over the S7 protocol.

The affected devices included Siemens S7-300, S7-1200, and S7-1500 controllers. CERT Polska said the activity was most likely reconnaissance conducted before the disruptive operation.

The destructive stage began around 5:30 a.m. on December 29 and continued until about 10:10 a.m. The attackers accessed the SCADA server’s web interface and connected to Siemens PLCs using S7 communications.

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Varshini
Varshini
Varshini is a Cyber Security expert in Threat Analysis, Vulnerability Assessment, and Research. Passionate about staying ahead of emerging Threats and Technologies..

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