An exposed public directory discovered via Shodan on 198[.]245[.]53[.]26 recently offered a rare glimpse into the rapid evolution of Banana RAT.
Instead of a standard payload host, researchers uncovered an active delivery infrastructure equipped with backend logic for variant generation.
By comparing two distinct malware detonations tied to this single server one from late May and another from early June 2026 defenders can track exactly how the operator upgraded their persistence, transport mechanisms, and artifact naming conventions.
Banana RAT is traditionally known for targeting Brazilian financial activity and Pix-related fraud. However, this specific incident highlights the technical iteration of its underlying Malware-as-a-Service architecture.
It gives defenders more than just a static list of indicators to hunt.
Banana RAT Randomizes Paths
The open directory exposed vital operational tooling and standard staging files, such as st.php and msedge.txt. Researchers recovered servidor_completo_pool.py, a FastAPI-based service acting as a production payload distributor.
This Python script functions as a live malware builder, pre-generating polymorphic payload variants in a pool while actively protecting scheduled task strings during its transformation process.

A secondary helper script, ofuscador.py, was also discovered alongside the main infrastructure.
This tool converts PowerShell commands into an ASCII-character reconstruction wrapper inside a BAT launcher, generating the initial lure files used to compromise victims.
By June 9, 2026, the threat actors significantly upgraded their execution chain while strictly maintaining the same staging host.
The initial-stage file was shifted to a PHP-based delivery mechanism that explicitly enforced TLS 1.2 connections before retrieving the final payload.

More importantly, the operators abandoned their fixed event-tracing installation paths in favor of a highly flexible, randomized persistence model.
ANY.RUN said, Command-and-control mechanisms also underwent a major architectural overhaul. Instead of a static typo-squatted domain, the newer payload derives a host-specific domain by hashing the victim’s unique machine identifier.
This results in dynamic subdomains communicating over encrypted WebSockets directly to a dedicated apex domain. The threat actors also placed this new infrastructure behind Cloudflare to obscure the backend origin IP.
This calculated shift prevents defenders from easily sinkholing the core infrastructure via generic domain-level blocklisting without risking collateral disruption.
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
| Tactic | Technique | ID | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Execution | Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell | T1059.001 | Hidden staging execution chains, dynamic base64 assembly, and memory-only execution |
| Execution | Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic | T1059.005 | Use of a standalone .vbs wrapper to launch the primary payload dropped into ProgramData |
Despite these advanced evasion tactics and transport upgrades, the operators left a critical fingerprint behind in their code. The newer runtime payload contains a hardcoded fallback IP address pointing directly back to 149[.]56[.]12[.]51.
This specific network indicator directly links the advanced June WebSocket branch to the older May detonation, confirming that both iterations belong to the same evolving campaign framework.
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