Belarus-aligned hackers deployed a VBScript wiper against a Ukrainian manufacturing company in late May 2026, marking a significant shift from espionage toward destructive operations.
The attacker as FrostyNeighbor, a group also tracked as UNC1151, PUSHCHA, Storm-0257, and TA445. The victim plays an important role in Ukraine’s transportation sector, potentially making it valuable to the country’s wartime operations.
The findings appear in ESET’s APT Activity Report covering April through September 2026. Researchers described the incident as the first destructive cyberattack by a Belarus-aligned threat actor that they have documented.
The distinction matters: it does not mean this was Ukraine’s first wiper attack, as Russia-aligned groups already have a history of destructive operations there.
Belarus-Linked Hackers Deploy Wiper
According to ESET, FrostyNeighbor deployed Chisel, UltraVNC, and Cobalt Strike before delivering the VBScript wiper through Group Policy.
This sequence placed several tools inside the victim’s environment before the destructive payload appeared. However, the report does not provide a complete timeline showing how the attackers moved between these stages.
Group Policy was the reported mechanism used to deploy the wiper. ESET did not disclose the script’s full code, its exact deletion method, or the number of affected computers.
The report also leaves the initial entry point unspecified, so the available evidence does not establish whether phishing, stolen credentials, or exploitation enabled this particular intrusion.
Researchers identified fried.backyardchickens[.]top as a Cobalt Strike command-and-control server associated with the operation.
This is the main published network indicator accompanying the account. The report does not provide a wiper filename or file hash, limiting the technical indicators available for this specific attack.
The victim remains unnamed, and ESET did not quantify data loss, production downtime, or transportation disruption.
Its findings establish that a destructive payload was deployed, but they do not establish the full operational damage. Keeping those details separate avoids overstating the incident’s confirmed impact.
ESET assessed that Belarus-aligned groups were becoming more aggressive while selecting targets increasingly consistent with Russia’s intelligence priorities.
FrostyNeighbor’s attack stood out because the victim’s transportation role appeared more closely connected to Moscow’s wartime interests than to Minsk’s immediate priorities. Researchers suggested the group may have acted as a proxy supporting Russian requirements.
However, that assessment remains qualified. ESET said its visibility did not allow a firm judgment about direct cooperation with Russia’s security apparatus.
The report does not prove that Russian officials ordered the attack or that Russian operators participated in its execution, esetstatic said.
The purpose of the wiping also remains uncertain. Researchers considered the possibility that the attackers wanted to erase evidence after an espionage operation, rather than primarily disrupt the company. Even under that explanation, deploying a wiper represents an escalation beyond information theft.
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