A severe vulnerability in Samba’s WINS server implementation for Active Directory domain controllers has been disclosed, enabling unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable systems.
Tracked as CVE-2025-10230, the flaw carries a CVSS 3.1 score of 10.0, underscoring its extreme risk and ease of exploitation. All Samba versions since 4.0 with WINS support enabled and the wins hook parameter set are affected, potentially exposing countless enterprise directory services to compromise.
How the WINS Hook Leads to Command Injection
Samba’s WINS server for Active Directory domain controllers accepts NetBIOS name change requests from clients. When administrators configure a wins hook an executable or script invoked on name changes Samba concatenates client-supplied NetBIOS names directly into shell commands without proper sanitization.
Because WINS names can include shell metacharacters within the 15-character NetBIOS limit, an attacker can craft a malicious name that injects additional shell instructions.
Upon processing a name change, the vulnerable Samba server executes the entire malicious command line, granting the attacker full control over the host.
- Unauthenticated attackers can send crafted NetBIOS name change requests.
- Malicious names containing shell metacharacters are passed unchecked.
- The hook script executes the injected payload with system privileges.
Enterprises relying on Samba domain controllers for Active Directory integration often enable WINS support to maintain NetBIOS compatibility with legacy Windows clients.
In such environments, an unauthenticated attacker could remotely trigger name change events requiring no valid credentials and immediately gain system-level privileges. The flaw does not depend on any user interaction or phishing; a simple network request suffices.
- Full domain compromise is possible through lateral movement.
- Data exfiltration and persistent backdoors can be installed.
- Public exploit code is likely to appear imminently due to the high CVSS score.
Mitigations
Samba maintainers have released patched security updates in versions 4.23.2, 4.22.5, and 4.21.9, available now from the official Samba security advisories. Administrators are strongly encouraged to upgrade to one of these versions or apply the backported patch immediately.
As a temporary workaround while patching systems should disable the wins hook parameter in their smb.conf or turn off WINS support entirely for domain controllers.
Specifically, keeping wins support = no ensures that even if wins hook remains configured, no vulnerable code path is invoked. For completeness, setting wins hook = to an empty value also neutralizes the risk. Standalone or member servers are unaffected, as they use a different WINS implementation.
This incident underscores the risks inherent in legacy network services and the importance of rigorous input validation. Organizations relying on Samba for directory services must reassess the necessity of WINS integration and consider modern alternatives.
With active exploits on the horizon, swift patch deployment and configuration review remain the most effective defenses against this critical remote code execution vulnerability.
Find this Story Interesting! Follow us on Google News , LinkedIn and X to Get More Instant Updates
