DarkBlinders Hackers Use Fake Meeting App and GitHub Backdoor to Spy on Government Targets

DarkBlinders hackers are using a fake video meeting application and GitHub repositories to conduct cyberespionage against targets in Israel and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.

Researchers observed the campaign between August and October 2026 and reported that it remained active at publication.

The investigation confirmed compromises involving a government cloud environment in Kurdistan and a prominent Israeli individual associated with the security sector. Observed activity included credential theft and the exfiltration of at least 1 GB of government cloud data.

DarkBlinders Hackers Use Fake Meeting App and GitHub Backdoor

The campaign combines government webmail impersonation, fraudulent cloud sharing pages, and StarkMeet, a fake meeting client.

Phishing infrastructure mimicked Kuwait’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Gulf Cooperation Council Secretariat General, suggesting broader interest in diplomatic targets.

StarkMeet’s unsigned Inno Setup installer presents version 3.2 of an apparently legitimate application. Its interface supports local camera, microphone, and screen previews, but joining a meeting always returns a fixed connection error.

Research workflow from RuntimeBroker.dll analysis
Research workflow from RuntimeBroker.dll analysis (Source: dreamgroup)

Separately, the installer places malicious components under %LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\RuntimeBroker. This separate installation lets the malware persist even if victims remove the visible meeting application.

A signed Microsoft vshost.exe executable, renamed RuntimeBroker.exe, loads RuntimeBroker.dll through an AppDomainManager mechanism. Persistence relies on the MicrosoftRuntime value in the current user’s Windows Run registry key.

The loader uses an embedded GitHub token to register infected systems in the PeakyBlindersTeam account’s myLic repository. Reports include usernames, machine names, domains, keyboard layouts, persistence status, and anti-analysis findings.

Researchers identified approximately ten initial host registrations but only two victims in the second-stage tasking repository. This difference supports an assessment of selective activation rather than automatic backdoor deployment.

For approved hosts, the operator supplies license material used to decrypt RuntimeBrokerApi.dll with AES-256-CBC. The loader derives the encryption key from the license string’s SHA-256 hash and loads the decrypted assembly directly into memory.

 StarkMeet component and execution sequence.
 StarkMeet component and execution sequence. (Source: dreamgroup)

The backdoor retrieves commands from the separate myCode repository approximately every 63 seconds. An embedded PsProxy.dll helper executes PowerShell through an internal runspace without launching powershell.exe, reducing visibility for detections dependent on that child process.

Additional capabilities support file uploads, downloads, and ZIP extraction. Both malware stages can retrieve replacement GitHub credentials from specially formatted comments in public Microsoft/vscode issues, potentially restoring communications after token revocation.

Dream linked the operation to four earlier campaign waves and assessed medium-to-high confidence overlap with UNC5795 and Dust Specter. Infrastructure reuse, matching malware, and overlapping victim profiles support those connections.

Researchers also assessed medium-confidence relationships with UNC5187 and possible placement within APT34. Persian keyboard metadata and Iranian hosting associations provide contextual clues, but neither independently proves attribution.

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Tamilselvan
Tamilselvanhttps://cyberpress.org/
Tamilselvan is an Investigative cybersecurity journalist dedicated to breaking stories on ransomware cartels, data breaches, and state-sponsored espionage.

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