Operation Dragon Whistle Deploys Cobalt Strike via Malicious PDF LNK Files

Threat actors are exploiting the high-pressure environment of university compliance to deploy stealthy malware.

Seqrite Labs recently uncovered “Operation Dragon Whistle,” a highly targeted spear-phishing campaign aiming at Changzhou University in China.

The attackers, identified with medium-high confidence as the UNG0002 group, use the mandatory 2026 fitness testing cycle as a powerful social engineering lure.

The attackers display deep institutional knowledge by including real staff names, phone numbers, and official seals in their decoy documents.

This creates a severe sense of urgency, as failing the fitness assessment directly impacts a student’s graduation eligibility.

Dragon Whistle Deploys Cobalt

The campaign begins with a phishing email from a spoofed sender delivering a ZIP attachment. This file mimics an official university notice but contains a complex, multi-stage infection mechanism designed to evade detection.

Dragon Whistle Deploys Cobalt (Source: seqrite)
Dragon Whistle Deploys Cobalt (Source: seqrite)

The initial interaction begins when a victim clicks a double-extension LNK file disguised as a PDF. The LNK triggers a lightweight VBScript that opens a legitimate decoy document while silently executing malicious background processes.

Dragon Whistle Deploys Cobalt (Source: seqrite)
Dragon Whistle Deploys Cobalt (Source: seqrite)

A legitimate archiving tool called Bandizip is weaponized to perform DLL sideloading by loading an attacker-controlled file.

The malware checks for active debugging tools and security environments before unpacking a payload directly into memory to deploy a Cobalt Strike Beacon.

Dragon Whistle Deploys Cobalt (Source: seqrite)
Dragon Whistle Deploys Cobalt (Source: seqrite)

By executing the payload entirely in memory, the malware minimizes on-disk artifacts and reduces forensic visibility.

The script also employs evasion techniques to bypass Windows security mechanisms, such as the Antimalware Scan Interface.

According to Seqrite research, the threat actors meticulously built their infrastructure using Alibaba Cloud to blend in with regional traffic.

They rotated their hosting providers from previous operations to evade network blocking based on autonomous system numbers.

The use of domestic Chinese enterprise tools and domain registrars further anchors the operation’s highly targeted nature.

Indicators of Compromise

File DescriptionSHA256 Hash
Malicious ZIP Attachmente7aff6a55a7866776272d9913dfbf9d7db33fc9de6aced22f2a195feebb0e85f
Decoy PDFfe11b199ada23d5ac25efc4215e67f4ff617ccb4d429eb64412072687367ca1c
LNK Payloadcd99e83d241cfbb41bfcd0bc622a87d16268e710ca7d736d0c5f44774e0056e2
Weaponized Bandizip.exec937eca7c4c9b98df9257d986e666d25411aac5fa39d21f7018dd2e1663f0c76
Malicious ark.x64.dll35a478f53f64bd412f374c65360fdba0518749537193669a8fe08d14bed65a2a
Cobalt Strike Beaconed7087e3afba4b320bdf04f32d3a6c567effd3d18a97682968e567000e70b335

Note: IP addresses and domains are intentionally defanged (e.g., [.]) to prevent accidental resolution or hyperlinking. Re-fang only within controlled threat intelligence platforms such as MISP, VirusTotal, or your SIEM.

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Varshini
Varshini
Varshini is a Cyber Security expert in Threat Analysis, Vulnerability Assessment, and Research. Passionate about staying ahead of emerging Threats and Technologies..

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