Hackers Use Fake AOMEI Updates to Install Persistent Backdoors on Windows Computers

A suspected supply chain campaign abused the update system of AOMEI Technology, the maker of AOMEI Backupper and AnyViewer. The attackers pushed the CROSSROAD downloader and the SHINYROAD backdoor to Windows systems.

Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) and Mandiant track the actor as UNC7017. They say the activity ran from April to July 2026.

AOMEI update malware

According to technical findings published by Google Cloud, UNC7017 did not leave malicious files on AOMEI’s servers. It briefly changed two configuration files, down_html.ini and Notifycfg.ini, and then restored them.

GTIG says this is the first supply chain compromise it has seen that used windows this short.

Confirmed windows include May 28 for 10 minutes, July 16 for 6 minutes, and July 20 for 5 minutes. Only clients that checked for updates during a window received the malware.

Clients that checked at any other time got clean files, which defeats point-in-time triage and automated file scanning.

The attackers did not exploit a software vulnerability, but instead abused the client’s normal update workflow. First, down_html.ini was changed to point to a malicious upgrade-now.zip, where the attackers raised the version number and supplied a matching MD5 hash so the client accepted it.

Notifycfg.ini was padded with more than 35,000 dummy lines, which forced an update and ran the unpacked upgrade-now.exe, which is CROSSROAD. CROSSROAD checks the host’s public IP and quits its main payload path if the country is China, takes a mutex, downloads component.zip, and unpacks it to %LOCALAPPDATA%\Radmin.

It creates a scheduled task named RadminComponentRuntime that runs FamItrfc.exe –runtimechk every three hours, before deleting itself using an NTFS alternate data stream trick and resetting the local .ini files to hide its tracks.

The legitimate, signed Radmin binary FamItrfc.exe then loads a malicious BlkScrDl.dll through DLL search-order hijacking. That DLL registers an in-process COM server, and RuntimeComponent.dll decrypts a ChaCha20-protected payload.

The payload is Python bytecode that runs in an embedded PocketPy interpreter and connects to 8.218.65.184:443. SHINYROAD supports remote shell access, junk-traffic padding, and in-memory extensions.

Staging moved from Alibaba Cloud storage in April and May to attacker-owned storage-data.com domains in early July. On July 20, the first download came from a public Google Cloud Storage bucket.

This let it bypass proxies that block newly registered domains. Also on July 20, a hidden 1×1 popup in Notifycfg.ini forced a WebDAV request to 8.210.84.56. This could leak NetNTLMv2 hashes.

In mid-July, the actors installed ADAPTAGENT, the Adaptix C2 agent, disguised as Nitro PDF tools. It used a \NitroRuntime scheduled task and beaconed every two minutes to 8.210.84.56:6800. On May 28, a modified Radmin Server was also installed.

Victims were opportunistic. They included IT services, telecom, and higher education organizations in Australia, Brazil, India, Pakistan, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Türkiye, and the United States. The ManageEngine Threat Analysis Lab first detected the activity in late May.

TypeIndicator
Domainsstorage-data.com, promotion.storage-data.com, aomei.storage-data.com
IPs8.210.84.56, 8.218.65.184, 47.239.60.117
Tasks\RadminComponentRuntime, \NitroRuntime
CROSSROAD SHA-2569a58e8f49edf5644e5728f74cf36f560d3d486fa51db4db69d927963c7aca450
BlkScrDl.dll SHA-2565837bc26a73cfb46ffd466cf889f03ce2f6a48f1f3fd42ec8be22189d51cab1e
User-AgentAnyviewer-loader/1.0

Mandiant told AOMEI on July 17, and AOMEI said on July 29 that it had taken corrective action. Fixing the servers does not clean machines that were already infected. Organizations should hunt across April to July for the tasks above and for unsigned DLLs loaded by Radmin binaries.

They should also block the listed infrastructure and outbound SMB and WebDAV traffic. Analysts should check the cached .ini files in AOMEI’s Tmphtml folder rather than the vendor’s live URLs.

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