Morphisec researchers have found a new XLoader infection chain. It starts with business-themed emails about purchase orders and payments. Each email carries a RAR archive that looks like an order but holds a single obfuscated JScript file.
XLoader is an information stealer that evolved from Formbook and targets browsers, email clients and FTP tools. The same campaign also delivered Agent Tesla, Remcos and XWorm.
Fake Orders Deliver XLoader
The first lure is a Greek email titled “RE: Παραγγελία 001828”. The “RE:” prefix suggests an ongoing conversation, and the message asks the reader to review the attached order and reply quickly.
It is sent to “undisclosed-recipients”, so the target organization is unknown. Two more lures are in Slovenian, asking for an invoice and price quote, and in English, asking for a quotation with an urgent item.
The Lua loader hides the console and tries to weaken defenses inside its own process. One routine zeroes the AMSI strings AmsiScanBuffer and AmsiInitialize.
Another overwrites 12 ntdll exports, including EtwEventWrite and NtTraceEvent, with a RET instruction followed by NOPs. Researchers say this shows intent, and they did not observe successful patching on a real host.
A conditional persistence branch runs only if a .mui marker file exists next to the interpreter. It would then create a scheduled task that runs a VBS launcher every ten minutes. The normal first run does not create that marker, so persistence was not confirmed.
The loader then decodes a 382,982-byte embedded PE file and maps it into LuaJIT memory. A packer with no import table decrypts the XLoader core in memory using RC4. It finds the APIs it needs by walking the process’s PEB (process environment block).
The XLoader core protects its code by decrypting functions only when they run and re-encrypting them afterward. Zscaler describes the same technique in recent XLoader builds.
The injector builds a clone of the XLoader stage and picks an x86 target process. It either finds a running process or starts a suspended SysWOW64 host such as cleanmgr.exe, mshta.exe, ftp.exe or find.exe.
It then maps a shared memory section into both LuaJIT and the target, and it redirects a target thread’s context to the mapped bootstrap code.
Because both processes see the same section, the code does not need WriteProcessMemory or a remote thread. The target’s original image stays mapped, so this is not process hollowing.
Many of these hosts are decoys, which matches Zscaler’s description of XLoader hiding its real C2 servers among fakes. The decrypted list alone does not show which endpoint is real, morphisec said.
Indicators of Compromise
| Indicator | Context |
|---|---|
| 6d7aaf1e563032ba46d8e0f1c8eab2b91d383fb2e5d00a1d4fff891f78a3572b | EML |
| 78f08bdefb127c96a64229b591de7b3f984a451796ad132cb26ff54c76d073d4 | EML |
Note: IP addresses and domains are intentionally defanged (e.g., [.]) to prevent accidental resolution or hyperlinking. Re-fang only within controlled threat intelligence platforms such as MISP, VirusTotal, or your SIEM.
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