GhostAction Hackers Infect 94 GitHub Repositories With Fake Font Malware to Steal Credentials

GhostAction attackers have compromised 94 GitHub repositories with a second-stage payload that disguises credential-stealing JavaScript as a font file.

The campaign abuses Visual Studio Code tasks to execute malware on developer workstations, extending an operation previously focused on stealing secrets through malicious GitHub Actions workflows.

OpenSourceMalware investigated the cluster after Jamf Threat Labs researcher Thijs Xhaflaire identified suspicious repositories while hunting PolinRider infections.

GhostAction Hackers Infect 94 GitHub Repositories

The repositories belong to 66 owners; researchers cloned 79 and confirmed the second-stage files in every accessible repository. The remaining 15 were unavailable for analysis.

The attack places a launcher in .vscode/tasks.json and the payload at public/fonts/fa-solid-400.woff2. Although its filename resembles a Font Awesome resource, the supposed font contains 38 lines of unobfuscated Node.js code.

A task labeled eslint-check invokes Node.js against the fake font. Its runOn: folderOpen setting requests execution when the project opens, while presentation options suppress terminal visibility.

Execution is not unconditional. The workspace must be trusted, and VS Code automatic tasks must be permitted. Opening or cloning a repository alone does not establish that the malware executed.

Once running, the payload collects the username, hostname, credential files, and environment variables. Targets include AWS credentials, npm and PyPI authentication, Git credentials, Kubernetes configuration, and Claude and Gemini login files. It also reads RSA and Ed25519 SSH private keys without truncation.

A recursive search additionally hunts for credential patterns throughout the home directory. Collected information is transmitted through an HTTP POST on port 8080. Earlier infrastructure research connected GhostAction’s collection activity to 193.32.204[.]199.

The payload installs a persistence mechanism on systems supporting cron. Every five minutes, a scheduled command retrieves a script from the attacker’s server using a hostname-specific path and pipes the response into Bash.

The entry carries the marker #ghc2; installation removes matching entries before adding another. Deleting the malicious repository files therefore does not remove the scheduled foothold.

Jenn Gile had not retrieved the server’s subsequent payload, leaving follow-on activity unresolved. Windows systems lack the targeted crontab mechanism, although credential collection may still execute.

The launcher resembles PolinRider’s fake-font technique, but GhostAction uses readable JavaScript, direct HTTP infrastructure, and cron rather than obfuscated blockchain-based loaders. Jenn Gile found no shared indicators that would establish common operators.

Most second-stage additions arrived on October 15, following earlier workflow injections. Two repositories received the new payload despite their owners previously removing malicious workflows.

Responders should revoke compromised GitHub access before cleanup, inspect writable repositories, remove malicious tasks and workflows, and investigate affected endpoints.

Earlier GhostAction analysis likewise warned that deleting workflows neither invalidates stolen access nor protects credentials exposed through Git history. Credential rotation must follow containment and be performed from a clean device.

IOCs

CategoryFile / IndicatorSHA-256 / Role
Filepublic/fonts/fa-solid-400.woff2 (batch tag reinject)cb3842832267421b9563c7bd32d3582a8fff624860e57c2c9058966735d4da60
Filepublic/fonts/fa-solid-400.woff2 (batch tag auto_20261015)61eca87b4b4c3e6248dc0fde25ff9cf28637798a8c4be172eaef9843252d12f6
Filepublic/fonts/fa-solid-400.woff2 (batch tag auto_20261014)92dec8f50d934c338ff3c1bcbf1c9b028aa9561128d0077a101a1ef4dac0f0db
File.vscode/tasks.jsona043f03e89ef55779f4f630138cf5efe1dd37632e176c7a0d9bbfa989ba84eeb
File.github/workflows/security-audit.yml (first version)6d258db70677c99c08c9db37e002751eb0f0fb7c0cab2a4effd7c8fa8d115d19
File.github/workflows/security-audit.yml (second version)d301438d713006a7a63889969fb5a30389c88bba5fbd89ef22becac611823a4f
File.github/workflows/lint.yml (reference second-stage workflow)40a007874722c46e0d194c4453f6cee26ee9c64513597784cc9c0e8b85471e7c
Network193[.]32[.]204[.]199GhostAction server
Networkhxxp://193[.]32[.]204[.]199:8080/?c=reinjectExfiltration from the infostealer and second workflow
Networkhxxp://193[.]32[.]204[.]199:8080/?c=auto_20261013Exfiltration with a date-stamped batch tag
Networkhxxp://193[.]32[.]204[.]199:8080/?c=auto_20261014Exfiltration with a date-stamped batch tag
Networkhxxp://193[.]32[.]204[.]199:8080/?c=auto_20261015Exfiltration with a date-stamped batch tag
Networkhxxp://193[.]32[.]204[.]199:8080/?c=securityEarly Stage 1 variant observed in one repository
Networkhxxp://193[.]32[.]204[.]199/?c=newFirst Stage 1 version
Networkhxxp://193[.]32[.]204[.]199:8080/c2/<hostname>Script fetched by the cron job

Note: IP addresses and domains are intentionally defanged (e.g., [.]) to prevent accidental resolution or hyperlinking. Re-fang only within controlled threat intelligence platforms such as MISP, VirusTotal, or your SIEM.

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Tamilselvan
Tamilselvanhttps://cyberpress.org/
Tamilselvan is an Investigative cybersecurity journalist dedicated to breaking stories on ransomware cartels, data breaches, and state-sponsored espionage.

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