GhostAction attackers have compromised 94 GitHub repositories with a second-stage payload that disguises credential-stealing JavaScript as a font file.
The campaign abuses Visual Studio Code tasks to execute malware on developer workstations, extending an operation previously focused on stealing secrets through malicious GitHub Actions workflows.
OpenSourceMalware investigated the cluster after Jamf Threat Labs researcher Thijs Xhaflaire identified suspicious repositories while hunting PolinRider infections.
GhostAction Hackers Infect 94 GitHub Repositories
The repositories belong to 66 owners; researchers cloned 79 and confirmed the second-stage files in every accessible repository. The remaining 15 were unavailable for analysis.
The attack places a launcher in .vscode/tasks.json and the payload at public/fonts/fa-solid-400.woff2. Although its filename resembles a Font Awesome resource, the supposed font contains 38 lines of unobfuscated Node.js code.
A task labeled eslint-check invokes Node.js against the fake font. Its runOn: folderOpen setting requests execution when the project opens, while presentation options suppress terminal visibility.
Execution is not unconditional. The workspace must be trusted, and VS Code automatic tasks must be permitted. Opening or cloning a repository alone does not establish that the malware executed.
Once running, the payload collects the username, hostname, credential files, and environment variables. Targets include AWS credentials, npm and PyPI authentication, Git credentials, Kubernetes configuration, and Claude and Gemini login files. It also reads RSA and Ed25519 SSH private keys without truncation.
A recursive search additionally hunts for credential patterns throughout the home directory. Collected information is transmitted through an HTTP POST on port 8080. Earlier infrastructure research connected GhostAction’s collection activity to 193.32.204[.]199.
The payload installs a persistence mechanism on systems supporting cron. Every five minutes, a scheduled command retrieves a script from the attacker’s server using a hostname-specific path and pipes the response into Bash.
The entry carries the marker #ghc2; installation removes matching entries before adding another. Deleting the malicious repository files therefore does not remove the scheduled foothold.
Jenn Gile had not retrieved the server’s subsequent payload, leaving follow-on activity unresolved. Windows systems lack the targeted crontab mechanism, although credential collection may still execute.
The launcher resembles PolinRider’s fake-font technique, but GhostAction uses readable JavaScript, direct HTTP infrastructure, and cron rather than obfuscated blockchain-based loaders. Jenn Gile found no shared indicators that would establish common operators.
Most second-stage additions arrived on October 15, following earlier workflow injections. Two repositories received the new payload despite their owners previously removing malicious workflows.
Responders should revoke compromised GitHub access before cleanup, inspect writable repositories, remove malicious tasks and workflows, and investigate affected endpoints.
Earlier GhostAction analysis likewise warned that deleting workflows neither invalidates stolen access nor protects credentials exposed through Git history. Credential rotation must follow containment and be performed from a clean device.
IOCs
| Category | File / Indicator | SHA-256 / Role |
|---|---|---|
| File | public/fonts/fa-solid-400.woff2 (batch tag reinject) | cb3842832267421b9563c7bd32d3582a8fff624860e57c2c9058966735d4da60 |
| File | public/fonts/fa-solid-400.woff2 (batch tag auto_20261015) | 61eca87b4b4c3e6248dc0fde25ff9cf28637798a8c4be172eaef9843252d12f6 |
| File | public/fonts/fa-solid-400.woff2 (batch tag auto_20261014) | 92dec8f50d934c338ff3c1bcbf1c9b028aa9561128d0077a101a1ef4dac0f0db |
| File | .vscode/tasks.json | a043f03e89ef55779f4f630138cf5efe1dd37632e176c7a0d9bbfa989ba84eeb |
| File | .github/workflows/security-audit.yml (first version) | 6d258db70677c99c08c9db37e002751eb0f0fb7c0cab2a4effd7c8fa8d115d19 |
| File | .github/workflows/security-audit.yml (second version) | d301438d713006a7a63889969fb5a30389c88bba5fbd89ef22becac611823a4f |
| File | .github/workflows/lint.yml (reference second-stage workflow) | 40a007874722c46e0d194c4453f6cee26ee9c64513597784cc9c0e8b85471e7c |
| Network | 193[.]32[.]204[.]199 | GhostAction server |
| Network | hxxp://193[.]32[.]204[.]199:8080/?c=reinject | Exfiltration from the infostealer and second workflow |
| Network | hxxp://193[.]32[.]204[.]199:8080/?c=auto_20261013 | Exfiltration with a date-stamped batch tag |
| Network | hxxp://193[.]32[.]204[.]199:8080/?c=auto_20261014 | Exfiltration with a date-stamped batch tag |
| Network | hxxp://193[.]32[.]204[.]199:8080/?c=auto_20261015 | Exfiltration with a date-stamped batch tag |
| Network | hxxp://193[.]32[.]204[.]199:8080/?c=security | Early Stage 1 variant observed in one repository |
| Network | hxxp://193[.]32[.]204[.]199/?c=new | First Stage 1 version |
| Network | hxxp://193[.]32[.]204[.]199:8080/c2/<hostname> | Script fetched by the cron job |
Note: IP addresses and domains are intentionally defanged (e.g., [.]) to prevent accidental resolution or hyperlinking. Re-fang only within controlled threat intelligence platforms such as MISP, VirusTotal, or your SIEM.
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