Hackers compromised at least 143 devices across 34 countries and installed proxy software to earn money from victims’ internet connections. The campaign targeted exposed network devices, turning them into residential proxy nodes without their owners’ permission.
The operation involved Pawns.app, a legitimate bandwidth-sharing service. While users can voluntarily install its software for passive income, attackers deployed it on compromised systems and linked those installations to their own account.
This abuse, known as proxyjacking, lets criminals profit from stolen bandwidth while making other users’ traffic appear to originate from victims’ networks.
Security researchers at Sysdig have previously documented the same business model in attacks exploiting vulnerable systems.
Hackers Hijack 143 Devices
GreyNoise identified successful compromises involving D-Link ShareCenter NAS devices, Ubiquiti UniFi Video NVR systems, and SAP NetWeaver Visual Composer installations.
The attacker exploited CVE-2024-3272 and CVE-2024-3273 against D-Link devices, CVE-2021-44228 against Ubiquiti systems, and CVE-2025-31324 against SAP NetWeaver.
Researchers also observed targeting of Hikvision and Dahua recording devices, although the supplied findings did not identify specific vulnerabilities for those attempts.
After gaining access, the attacker installed Pawns.app using command-line options that accept account credentials and device information. These options allowed the criminal to associate victims’ bandwidth with an attacker-controlled payout account.
In some cases, the attacker also configured SSH key authentication. This provided a backup method for accessing compromised devices.
IPRoyal identifies Pawns.app as a direct partner supplying residential proxy endpoints. That commercial relationship explains how shared connections enter a proxy network; it does not establish that either company authorized the compromises.

GreyNoise listed 209.99.190.80 as an exploitation source and skynox7@proton.me as the Pawns payout account.
It also supplied seven SHA256 hashes for Pawns.app binaries, stressing that these files are not necessarily malicious when installed with consent.
Separately, a GreyNoise product demonstration helped an organization uncover a serious intrusion through suspicious Microsoft Entra ID sign-ins.
The logins came from residential IP addresses in locations that appeared reasonable for the affected users. Initial investigation confirmed that the addresses were residential proxies, but that alone did not prove an intrusion.
The stronger warning emerged when multiple users authenticated through the same residential IP address. Further investigation confirmed malicious activity. GreyNoise withheld additional incident details.
Residential proxies weaken detection methods that rely mainly on unusual countries or known hosting providers. Microsoft has also documented Midnight Blizzard using residential proxy networks to conceal malicious authentication traffic.microsoft
GreyNoise recommends checking authentication behavior beyond location, including device identifiers, session identifiers, and User-Agent strings.
Multiple enterprise accounts using one residential proxy address deserve closer investigation, rather than automatic classification as malicious.
Indicators of Compromise
| IOC Type | Indicator | Description |
|---|---|---|
| SHA256 | e3dedf983c572d3e646a9b70fe9b41be497a3a2e5342c36dd3bd37cef7ebeffd | Pawns.app binary |
| SHA256 | fdc18f4287c1c6a285c664d3ce0f17d3479bc246bc6c163eb90b1a84adb453a7 | Pawns.app binary |
Note: IP addresses and domains are intentionally defanged (e.g., [.]) to prevent accidental resolution or hyperlinking. Re-fang only within controlled threat intelligence platforms such as MISP, VirusTotal, or your SIEM.
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