HoneyMyte’s CoolClient Malware Now Steals Browser Logins In Latest Variant

The HoneyMyte APT group, also known as Mustang Panda, has upgraded its CoolClient backdoor with browser login stealers and advanced surveillance tools.

This evolution targets government entities in Southeast Asia, Myanmar, Mongolia, Malaysia, Russia, Thailand, and Pakistan.

HoneyMyte focuses on espionage in Asia and Europe, hitting government targets hardest. The group deploys tools like ToneShell rootkit, PlugX, QReverse, CoolClient backdoors, and USB worms such as Tonedisk.

In 2025, they enhanced CoolClient with browser credential theft, data exfiltration scripts, and reconnaissance features. Full IOCs and details are in Kaspersky’s Intelligence Reporting Service.

CoolClient Backdoor Evolution

Sophos spotted early CoolClient in 2022; Trend Micro analyzed an update in 2023. Recent variants appear in multi-stage infections alongside PlugX and LuminousMoth.

Variants of CoolClient abusing different software for DLL sideloading (2021–2025) (Source: SECURELIST)
Variants of CoolClient abusing different software for DLL sideloading (2021–2025) (Source: SECURELIST)

Delivery uses encrypted loaders with DLL sideloading via signed binaries from BitDefender, VLC, Ulead PhotoImpact, and Sangfor apps (2021-2025).

The latest version abuses Sangfor’s Sang.exe to load libngs.dll, which decrypts loader.dat, time.dat, and main.dat. These hold shellcode and DLLs for injection into write.exe processes.

Overview of CoolClient execution flow (Source: SECURELIST)
Overview of CoolClient execution flow (Source: SECURELIST)
FileDescription
Sang.exeLegitimate binary for DLL sideloading
libngs.dllDecrypts and executes loader.dat shellcode
loader.datShellcode, parameter checker, process injection
time.datEncrypted config
main.datCore functionality DLL

Execution and Persistence

CoolClient uses parameters like “install,” “work,” and “passuac”:

  • install: Sets Run key persistence, injects loader.dat, checks AV (e.g., 360sd.exe), installs “media_updaten” service, bypasses UAC.
  • work: Injects into write.exe.
  • passuac: Spoofs svchost.exe, creates ComboxResetTask, elevates via token duplication.

The final DLL enables keylogging, TCP tunneling, reverse proxy, file ops, plus new clipboard monitoring (using GetClipboardData/GetWindowTextW) and HTTP proxy credential sniffing from traffic, as reported by Securelist.

Plugins Expand Capabilities

CoolClient stages plugins via C2:

PluginFunctions
ServiceMgrS.dllEnumerate/start/stop/create/delete services
FileMgrS.dllList drives/files, delete/create/move, ZIP, execute, search
RemoteShellS.dllHidden cmd.exe with I/O redirection to C2

C2 uses TCP/UDP with magic values (e.g., 0xFFAABBCC for beaconing).

Browser Login Data Stealer

Post-exploitation, HoneyMyte deploys stealers after ToneShell/ QReverse:

VariantTargetMethodMD5
AChromePE321A5A9C013CE1B65ABC75D809A25D36A7
BEdgePE32E1B7EF0F3AC0A0A64F86E220F362B149
CChromiumDLL sideloadingDA6F89F15094FD3F74BA186954BE6B05

Variant C copies Login Data/Local State, queries SQLite for credentials, decrypts via DPAPI/AES, outputs to License.txt. Linked to LuminousMoth via code reuse.

Scripts aid theft:

  • 1.bat: Downloads curl/rar/nbtscan, profiles system, exfils via FTP.
  • Ttraazcs32.ps1: Collects docs (doc/xls/pdf, <60 days), RARs, uploads.
  • t.ps1: Decrypts Chrome keys, exfils to Pixeldrain.

Monitor for DLL sideloading, Sangfor abuse, services like media_updaten, and C2s (account.hamsterxnxx[.]com).

Defend with behavior detection, DPAPI monitoring, script controls, and network traffic analysis.

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Varshini
Varshini
Varshini is a Cyber Security expert in Threat Analysis, Vulnerability Assessment, and Research. Passionate about staying ahead of emerging Threats and Technologies..

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