The Indonesian government’s digital infrastructure has faced significant cybersecurity challenges, with recent incidents highlighting systemic vulnerabilities in national data systems.
A ransomware attack on Indonesia’s Temporary National Data Centre (PDN-2) by threat actor Brain Cipher compromised thousands of terabytes across 210 government institutions, while subsequent website defacements like the March 2025 breach of Bandung DPRD’s legislative portal by group Euphoria demonstrate ongoing security gaps.
Exploitation of Security Vulnerabilities
The attacks leveraged multiple attack vectors:
1. Ransomware deployment
Brain Cipher employed LockBit-derived ransomware to encrypt critical data through ESXi hypervisor vulnerabilities.
The attack exploited password mismanagement, where forensic analysis revealed compromised credentials that enabled initial access.
The malware utilized AES-256-CBC encryption with a 54KB decryptor file delivered via dark web channels.
2. Web application weaknesses
Recent defacements, including the Bandung DPRD breach, exploited:
- SQL injection vulnerabilities in Content Management Systems (CMS) through unsanitized user inputs
- Brute force attacks against administrative portals using credential-stuffing techniques
- Outdated server software with unpatched CVEs in Apache Tomcat and WordPress instances
The Trenggalek Regency breach demonstrated the attacker’s ability to manipulate database queries through UNION-based SQL injections, exposing sensitive user credentials.
Attack Methodology Analysis
Stage 1: Initial Compromise
- Brain Cipher used phishing campaigns with malicious Office macros to establish a foothold
- Web defacements employed automated scanners like Acunetix to identify vulnerable parameters
Stage 2: Lateral Movement
- Attackers exploited Windows Defender’s limited EDR capabilities to disable security controls
- Privilege escalation via mimikatz tool extraction of domain admin credentials
Stage 3: Impact Operations
| Technique | Implementation |
|---|---|
| Data Encryption | XFS partition encryption with intermittent key rotation |
| Defacement | Modified .htaccess files and injected malicious iFrames |
| Exfiltration | Tor-based C2 channels moving 2.1TB/day during peak |
The attackers employed time-based blind SQL injection to map database schemas without triggering alerts, while ransomware payloads incorporated worm-like propagation through Server Message Block (SMB) protocols.
Systemic Weaknesses and Response
The incidents revealed critical infrastructure flaws:
- Inadequate backup protocols: Only 34% of affected agencies maintained functional backups
- Security tool limitations: Over-reliance on signature-based antivirus (Windows Defender) rather than behavioral analysis
- Personnel gaps: Cybersecurity teams lacked expertise in memory forensics and reverse engineering
Post-attack measures included:
- Presidential Directive No. 17/2025, mandating zero-trust architecture implementation
- Rp 700 billion ($46M) budget reallocation for SIEM system deployment across 2,300 govt endpoints
- BSSN (National Cyber and Crypto Agency) conducting purple team exercises simulating advanced persistent threat (APT) tactics
These events underscore the urgent need for Indonesia to adopt NIST Cybersecurity Framework controls, particularly in identity management (AC-2) and incident response (IR-4).
The combination of technical debt in legacy systems and emerging threats from ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) ecosystems creates an ongoing risk landscape requiring continuous security investments.
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