Researchers linked the campaign to earlier Kimsuky operations involving Endpoint ransomware. Similarities include reused script code, matching malware settings, and shared encryption features.
The September 2026 case shows changes in delivery methods and infrastructure while retaining core elements of previous attacks.
The initial file, “resume.hwp,” contains malicious embedded OLE data. When opened, the Hangul process writes two files, “pdf.exe” and “pdf.exe.manifest,” into the Windows temporary folder without further user interaction.
However, dropping these files does not immediately trigger the remaining attack. The document includes a hyperlink inviting the reader to open a supposed PDF resume named “resume_{name}.pdf.”
Kimsuky Resumes Deliver Ransomware
Clicking that link launches “pdf.exe,” a VbsEdit script executor, which runs the malicious script stored in “pdf.exe.manifest.” This script creates a batch file named “lpe{random value}.bat” in the temporary folder.
The infection then progresses through Batch, VBS, and PowerShell scripts. These stages deploy a Python backdoor, install Quasar RAT, and finally execute Funhouse ransomware.
ASEC found that the batch script shares code characteristics with scripts from earlier Kimsuky campaigns.
Those previous operations also used layered scripts and scheduled tasks to deploy Python backdoors, showing continuity despite changes to the initial delivery method.
The batch file in the current campaign was periodically updated and provided an additional persistence mechanism, helping the attackers maintain access during the operation.
Quasar RAT stores its settings in a file with a “.dwg” extension. In the September campaign, the configuration file was named “dog.dwg,” replacing “se.dwg” used in February and June cases.
Its reported version changed from 1.1.8 to 4.4.3, while the command server changed to 70.36.97[.]236:443. Despite these updates, all three samples retained the mutex “_QQ_XCZ_VCXZ,” a named object used to manage execution.
Funhouse also closely matches the ransomware observed in June. Both append “.Funhouse” to encrypted files and create a ransom note named “How To Restore Your Files.Txt.”
They share HC-128 encryption, key generation using CryptGenRandom, Curve25519, and SHA-512, and a 72-byte encryption footer.
By comparison, the February Endpoint sample used ChaCha20, illustrating changes within the related ransomware lineage. ASEC’s earlier Endpoint analysis also documented ChaCha20 and the same ransom-note filename.
The September sample changed its contact address to Funhouse8764@tutamail[.]com while preserving other identifying features.
ASEC assessed that replacing recently used malicious shortcut files with a familiar Hangul resume may reduce suspicion and encourage clicks. Importantly, the malicious execution chain depends on the reader clicking the document’s embedded link.
Indicators of Compromise
| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| MD5 | 17d97e3ee3185d82812a4014444c36f3 | Reported campaign artifact; specific file not identified |
| MD5 | 327617e977eefd15708568f43140e595 | Reported campaign artifact; specific file not identified |
Note: IP addresses and domains are intentionally defanged (e.g., [.]) to prevent accidental resolution or hyperlinking. Re-fang only within controlled threat intelligence platforms such as MISP, VirusTotal, or your SIEM.
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