Kimusky Hackers Leverage ClickFix Method to Deploy Malicious Scripts on Target Systems

Cybersecurity researchers at the Genians Security Center (GSC) identified a sophisticated campaign attributed to the North Korean APT group Kimsuky, leveraging the so-called “ClickFix” tactic to compromise target systems.

ClickFix, first documented by Proofpoint in April 2024, exploits user psychology by presenting seemingly legitimate troubleshooting instructions or security verification prompts, ultimately coercing victims into executing malicious PowerShell or script commands on their own devices.

Evolution of the ClickFix Tactic

The ClickFix method is a form of social engineering that disguises malicious intent behind plausible instructions, such as fixing browser errors or entering authentication codes.

Kimusky Hackers
Attack Scenario

Originally, it involved fake error messages on compromised websites, prompting users to copy and paste code into PowerShell.

Recent iterations have expanded to multilingual phishing emails, fake job portals, and even mimicked security interfaces of popular Korean web portals.

In each scenario, the user is manipulated into executing a pre-crafted command, typically obfuscated to evade detection and reverse-engineered analysis.

For instance, in a January 2025 spear-phishing attack, Kimsuky operatives impersonated a European journalist to lure a South Korean expert into opening a malicious Visual Basic Script (.vbs) file.

Kimusky Hackers
Malicious File Delivered via pCloud

The script, delivered via an encrypted archive, executed a multi-stage payload: launching a decoy document, creating hidden directories, downloading further malware from a command-and-control (C2) server, and establishing persistence through scheduled tasks.

Obfuscation techniques, such as inserting random numeric strings and using reverse string transformations, were employed to bypass signature-based detection.

By March 2025, the group had shifted to a more refined ClickFix approach. Targets received phishing emails purportedly from aides to senior U.S. officials, containing multilingual manuals and code snippets.

According to Genians Security Center (GSC) Report, victims were instructed to paste obfuscated PowerShell commands often in reverse order into their consoles.

These commands, once executed, would contact C2 infrastructure, download additional payloads, and exfiltrate sensitive information.

Infrastructure and Attribution

Kimsuky’s infrastructure is characterized by a rotating set of C2 domains, often leveraging compromised or newly registered domains with plausible names.

Notable C2 addresses include konamo[.]xyz, raedom[.]store, kida.plusdocs.kro[.]kr, and others, spanning hosting providers in South Korea, the U.S., Japan, and beyond.

The threat group also utilizes cloud storage services (e.g., Google Drive, Proton Drive) for payload delivery and decoy content.

Linguistic analysis of phishing lures and web interfaces further supports attribution to North Korea, with the use of distinctive vocabulary and IT terminology consistent with North Korean dialects.

Additionally, the campaign’s technical indicators such as repeated use of the string “7539518426” for obfuscation, and the deployment of RATs like QuasarRAT align with known Kimsuky TTPs, particularly those observed in the ongoing “BabyShark” campaign.

The ClickFix tactic underscores the necessity of robust endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions capable of behavioral analysis and real-time threat visibility.

Unlike traditional malware, ClickFix relies on user execution, making it less susceptible to conventional signature-based defenses.

EDR platforms, such as Genian EDR, can track process chains initiated by PowerShell, identify abnormal behaviors, and provide actionable intelligence for SOC teams.

Security awareness training remains crucial, as the attack hinges on social engineering. Users should be wary of unsolicited instructions to execute scripts or commands, especially those requiring administrative privileges.

Organizations are encouraged to update firewall blocklists with the latest IoCs and leverage threat intelligence to pivot and correlate related activity.

Indicators of Compromise (IoC)

TypeValue/Hash/Domain/IP
MD556233bac07f4f9c43585e485e70b6169
MD5a523bf5dca0f2a4ace0cf766d9225343
MD5ad6104a503b46bf6ea505fe8b3182970
MD5bf795a376233032d05766a396b3d6e08
MD5ca13c54987293ae7efc22b14e1153c1e
MD5d10208c32fbbb5cacbd2097fc0dcd444
MD5fc4c319d7940ad1b7c0477469420bd11
MD5fcde319b752cacec40ffba130067de0d
MD58c33e8439844c315b7b3f21b0c1633aa
MD58ff155a2962c77e9da05bd0476af36be
MD512bfe00206b2e83c7ff79b657d3c56df
MD589a725b08ab0e8885fc03b543638be96
MD5627b856884604880a5c009ebf7173efb
MD5913fe4236ca5e34879d2a3228da6b9c6
Domainkonamo[.]xyz
Domainraedom[.]store
Domainkida.plusdocs.kro[.]kr
Domainmspro.kro[.]kr
Domainmsprovider.menews.o-r[.]kr
Domainaccount-profile.servepics[.]com
Domainsecuredrive.fin-tech[.]com
Domainsecuredrive.privatedns[.]org
Domainsecuredrive.servehttp[.]com
Domainandrocl.csproject[.]org
Domainlogin.androclesproject.o-r[.]kr
IP1.223.129[.]234
IP103.149.98[.]247
IP103.149.98[.]248
IP106.243.157[.]158
IP112.74.194[.]45
IP115.92.4[.]123
IP118.193.69[.]151
IP121.179.161[.]231
IP157.7.184[.]11
IP162.0.229[.]227
IP172.86.111[.]75
IP210.179.30[.]213
IP211.170.73[.]245
IP38.180.157[.]197
IP65.254.248[.]151

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Mandvi
Mandvi
Mandvi is a Security Reporter covering data breaches, malware, cyberattacks, data leaks, and more at Cyber Press.

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