Signed Logitech Installer Used In TCLBANKER Banking Trojan Attacks

A new Brazilian banking trojan named TCLBANKER. This threat, assessed as a major evolution of the older Maverick and Sorvepotel malware families, specifically targets 59 banking, fintech, andcryptocurrency platforms across Brazil.

The campaign, tracked internally as REF3076, utilizes a sophisticated loader that deploys both a credential-harvesting banking trojan and self-propagating worm modules.

Logitech Installer Spreads TCLBANKER

The attack chain begins with a malicious MSI installer packaged within a ZIP archive. This installer abuses a legitimate, digitally signed Logitech application, Logi AI Prompt Builder, which is built on the Flutter framework.

By utilizing a technique called DLL sideloading, the malware forces the legitimate Logitech executable to load a disguised malicious file named screen_retriever_plugin.dll.

Once loaded into memory, the malware patches Event Tracing for Windows to turn off user-mode telemetry and evade detection by security monitoring tools.

TCLBANKER then performs extensive environmental checks to generate a unique system hash that acts as an environmental gate for payload decryption.

File directory contents showing a malicious DLL (Source: elastic)
File directory contents showing a malicious DLL (Source: elastic)

This ensures that the malware will silently fail to decrypt its embedded modules if it detects that it is running within a security sandbox or analyst environment.

To generate this fingerprint, TCLBANKER looks for underlying virtualization signatures from software providers such as VMware, VirtualBox, KVM, Xen, Parallels, and QEMU.

Patching via EtwEventWrite (Source: elastic)
Patching via EtwEventWrite (Source: elastic)

It also verifies that the target machine has at least 64 gigabytes of disk space, two processor cores, and default Brazilian Portuguese language and timezone settings.

To protect the execution pipeline, a comprehensive watchdog thread continuously hunts for active analysis tools, disassemblers, and debuggers.

Environmental hashing function (Source: elastic)
Environmental hashing function (Source: elastic)

Once system persistence is established via the Windows Task Scheduler, the core banking trojan actively monitors the victim’s browser address bar.

Using UI Automation, the malware reads the active URL to detect when a victim navigates to a monitored financial or cryptocurrency website.

Upon a successful match, TCLBANKER establishes an authenticated WebSocket connection to its command-and-control server and activates a full-screen overlay framework.

This WPF-based framework orchestrates operator-driven social engineering by rendering fake credential prompts, vishing wait screens, and fake Windows Update stalls directly over the victim’s desktop.

These malicious overlays utilize window display affinity settings to remain completely invisible to screen capture tools.

According to Elastic research, TCLBANKER includes a secondary payload containing two distinct self-propagating worm modules. The first module is a WhatsApp bot that hijacks authenticated browser sessions by cloning the user’s local profile data and IndexedDB storage.

This allows the malware to bypass QR code authentication and directly send malicious messages containing malware download links to the victim’s personal contacts.

Simultaneously, the second module acts as an Outlook email bot that abuses Microsoft COM automation to harvest local address books.

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Varshini
Varshini
Varshini is a Cyber Security expert in Threat Analysis, Vulnerability Assessment, and Research. Passionate about staying ahead of emerging Threats and Technologies..

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