Hackers Use Lotus Wiper To Destroy Drives In Energy Sector Cyberattack

Kaspersky researchers have uncovered a previously undocumented destructive malware campaign targeting Venezuela’s energy and utilities sector, deploying a new wiper dubbed Lotus Wiper that permanently destroys data across physical drives with no recovery possible.

Unlike ransomware, the attack carries no extortion component its sole purpose is annihilation.

The artifacts linked to this campaign were discovered on a public malware repository in mid-December 2025, during a period of heightened geopolitical tensions in the Caribbean region.

Notably, state-owned oil company Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) suffered a disabling cyberattack around the same time.

However, no confirmed link has been established between that incident and the Lotus Wiper campaign. Kaspersky researchers believe the attacker compiled the wiper in late September 2025, indicating months of deliberate preparation before deployment.

The attack begins with two batch scripts OhSyncNow.bat and notesreg.bat which serve as the orchestration layer before the final wiper payload executes.

The first script, OhSyncNow.bat, identifies the working directory, turns off the Windows Interactive Services Detection (UI0Detect) service to suppress on-screen warnings, and then checks for a remote XML flag file (OHSync.xml) on the organization’s NETLOGON domain share.

The presence of that remote file acts as a network-based trigger, signaling compromised machines across the domain to begin execution a tactic consistent with classic backdoor coordination mechanisms.

Once triggered, notesreg.bat takes over the destructive preparation phase. It enumerates all local user accounts, resets their passwords to random strings, marks them as inactive, turns off cached logins, and forcibly logs off all active sessions.

Lotus Wiper Leaves Systems Completely Unrecoverable

Once executed, Lotus Wiper grants all token privileges full administrative access, then immediately begins a multi-phase destruction sequence.

USN journal being cleared using IOCTL controls (Source: securelist)
USN journal being cleared using IOCTL controls (Source: securelist)

It first deletes all Windows System Restore points by dynamically loading srclient.dll and calling SRSetRestorePoint and SRRemoveRestorePoint in reverse sequence methodically wiping every recovery checkpoint on the system.

Detecting UI0Detect service status query (Source: securelist)
Detecting UI0Detect service status query (Source: securelist)

It then opens each physical drive and uses IOCTL_DISK_GET_DRIVE_GEOMETRY_EX to retrieve disk geometry, subsequently writing zeroes across every sector of every drive a process executed at both the start and end of its runtime.

Between physical drive wiping securelist rounds, Lotus Wiper enumerates all mounted volumes using FindFirstVolumeW and FindNextVolumeW.

These spawning threads clear each volume’s USN change journal and delete every file. Files are overwritten with zeroes via FSCTL_SET_ZERO_DATA, renamed to random hexadecimal strings, and then deleted using DeleteFileW.

For locked files that resist deletion, the wiper calls MoveFileExW with a deferred deletion flag, queuing their removal at the next system reboot. The result is a system left in a state where no data, partitions, restore points, or journal entries survive.

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Varshini
Varshini
Varshini is a Cyber Security expert in Threat Analysis, Vulnerability Assessment, and Research. Passionate about staying ahead of emerging Threats and Technologies..

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