A popular-looking extension angular-studio.ng-angular-extension has been caught delivering sophisticated malware to developers.
Masquerading as a legitimate “Angular Language Service,” the extension provided actual IntelliSense and diagnostic features by bundling legitimate dependencies like @angular/language-service and typescript.
However, beneath the surface, it executed a hidden payload that drained crypto wallets and stole developer credentials.
The attack vector begins when a developer opens any HTML or TypeScript file in VS Code. The extension package.json registers an activation event that triggers. extension/index.js.
This file contains an encrypted loader that uses Node.js crypto to decrypt a large hex string using AES-256-CBC.
Once decrypted, the loader executes a timing delay before running eval() on the payload. This method gives the malicious code full access to the VS Code API, Node.js modules, and the host file system.
C2 via Solana Etherhiding
The malware employs a technique known as “Etherhiding” to conceal its Command and Control (C2) infrastructure.
Instead of querying a traditional domain that could be blocked, the payload retrieves a specific transaction from the Solana blockchain.
- Solana Address:
BjVeAjPrSKFiingBn4vZvghsGj9KCE8AJVtbc9S8o8SC - Mechanism: The malware parses the “memo” field of the account’s transactions.
- Payload: The memo contains a Base64-encoded URL (currently
hxxp://217.69.11.57/...), which directs the malware to the next stage.
This method offers “takedown resistance” because the blockchain is immutable and highly available. Attackers can send a new transaction to the address to update the C2 URL without modifying the installed extension.
Geofencing and Persistence
Before executing the second stage, the malware performs aggressive geofencing. It checks the system’s locale, timezone, and UTC offset against Russian indicators (e.g., ru_RU, Europe/Moscow).
If a match is found, execution terminates immediately, a common tactic to avoid prosecution in specific jurisdictions.
For persistence, the malware creates a hidden init.json file in the user’s home directory (e.g., %APPDATA% on Windows or ~/.config/ on Linux) to track execution timestamps.
The final payload is a comprehensive stealer explicitly designed for supply chain attacks, mirroring tactics seen in previous worms, such as Shai-Hulud, as reported by Annex.
- Developer Theft: Scans
.npmrcfiles for authentication tokens and usesgit credential fillto dump GitHub passwords. It attempts to verify these tokens immediately against live APIs. - Asset Theft: Targets over 60 cryptocurrency wallets (MetaMask, Phantom, Ledger Live).
- Process Termination: Forcefully kills Chrome and Firefox processes to unlock database files for cookie and password extraction.
- Exfiltration: All data is zipped and POSTed to
108[.]61.208.161.
IOCs
| Indicator Type | Value | Context |
|---|---|---|
| C2 IP | 217.69.11[.]57 | Stage 2 Payload Delivery |
| C2 IP | 108.61.208[.]161 | Data Exfiltration Endpoint |
| Extension ID | angular-studio.ng-angular-extension | Open VSX Identifier |
| Solana Address | BjVeAjPrSKFiingBn4vZvghsGj9KCE8AJVtbc9S8o8SC | Etherhiding Configuration Source |
| File Path | init.json | Hidden persistence file in AppData/Config |
Follow us on Google News , LinkedIn and X to Get More Instant Updates. Set Cyberpress as a Preferred Source in Google.