Massistant: Chinese Forensic Tool Harvests SMS, Images, Audio, and GPS Data from Mobile Devices

Researchers at Lookout Threat Lab have recently uncovered “Massistant,” an advanced Android-based mobile forensics application actively deployed by Chinese law enforcement to extract sensitive information from mobile devices.

The tool is considered the direct successor to “MFSocket,” an earlier forensics solution developed by the publicly listed firm Xiamen Meiya Pico Information Co., Ltd., now known as SDIC Intelligence Xiamen Information Co., Ltd.

First identified on Chinese social media in 2019 and corroborated through technical analysis, MFSocket had become notorious for allowing police to collect device-level evidence at border checkpoints and during police stops via physical access to the device.

The emergence of Massistant marks a significant evolution in mobile forensics capabilities within mainland China, building upon and expanding the feature set of its predecessor.

Chinese Forensic Tool
Baidu Zhidao question/answer forums 

Data Collection Capabilities

Massistant is not distributed via conventional application stores but requires installation through physical device access, typically at the hands of authorities.

Upon launch, the application requests a comprehensive suite of permissions: access to GPS location, SMS messages, contacts, call logs, images, and audio files.

The forensic tool is designed to operate in conjunction with proprietary desktop software specifically, the Meiya Pico “Mobile Master” ecosystem establishing communication via localhost over port 10102, mirroring the architecture of MFSocket.

The application leverages Android Debug Bridge (ADB) and port forwarding to facilitate seamless data extraction while the device is connected via USB.

Unlike typical spyware, Massistant does not maintain persistent internet-based command and control infrastructure; its primary data exfiltration occurs during direct USB connections.

Massistant also employs sophisticated methods such as Android Accessibility Services, labeled internally as “AutoClick,” to automatically overcome device security prompts and expedite permission acquisition.

This tactic can bypass certain security controls, including those implemented by security-centric Android environments like Xiaomi’s MIUI Security Center.

Furthermore, Massistant enhances third-party messaging data collection, expanding beyond Telegram (as supported by MFSocket) to include Signal and Letstalk.

International Implications

Once exfiltration is complete and the USB connection is severed, Massistant is programmed to self-delete using a BroadcastReceiver, reducing its likelihood of post-analysis discovery.

Chinese Forensic Tool
Public documents announcing the name change from Meiya Pico to SDIC Intelligence

Nonetheless, reports from Chinese Q&A forums indicate that unsuccessful uninstallation events have allowed users to detect the application on returned devices.

Notably, the app included only two non-system default language options: Simplified Chinese and US English, indicating a focus on both domestic and international targets.

The introduction of Massistant occurs alongside legislative shifts specifically, a 2024 law empowering Chinese police to analyze confiscated devices without a warrant which heightens the risk for business travelers and expatriates.

Lookout researchers have documented anecdotal evidence of business travelers’ devices being persistently compromised, sometimes with “headless” surveillance modules remaining after return.

Meiya Pico, recently rebranded as SDIC Intelligence, controls approximately 40% of the digital forensics market in China and maintains an international presence, with past sales reaching Russian military and participation in Belt and Road forensic training programs.

In 2021, the company was sanctioned by the US government for ties to Chinese military intelligence activities. Chinese authorities reportedly advise against manual uninstallation of forensic tools like Massistant, with references surfaced on local forums, although no direct documentation was found on government sites.

Indicators of Compromise (IoC)

SHA1
895ad87f382de53f7323117b47150eaf0550cbf4
7a6d81b19425d985270121c46368c9ac12ed1b26
14c29a0e44076c88b177193650a9d4567291d0ea
256c357f884f33c032d2352ee6ff73fe94da83a8
91a6e8769be93f625f239f9c8bad82545c936f20
ceb3b0c6dc703c76d274f4862d98b4f054536518
66ef2c18178d8988a210d09b17f3b23394306b40
4cc68d1538c372a31d2989e04f1c0726a66ebb7a
e5d4685ceedc44184ae0d249269a94018c88a4ff
0275f283ce280f717a2674d82aaf1cb562c3b90c
215bd2972c5598787addad911915b9a04932d68d
990004827ec2b08b52afd0df5750cfed502dbc1c
df4c8bccadf71d5c29a7a92d40fee4629fe7a384
93c5cd3a0bb04012927ccd29e505772492fcfbee
8659920f99a96c294c9857a761ce0729f3a8f2f7
71fc752af7d108b7aede7d17ec7dae3a9cbb3470
4b30d1d9d4a1e4571d4cd7aaeb91aee192a7a512
1c6e67c6f1c9b6a332d844b772af3ef9e5e8d8dd
f22eea7248d023f74f631a8812115bf4981df2e7
2458fa6f7b0faf662a940ab92a1f144b2c384ce4
f514f711b4b83d3cf2a4b4c602483a120b448f63
7ec4f46df0bb9fca801719b7f67f642bdd0a9e97
c17e9325a6932ff8b725b18e4ddcb6dadab99457

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Mandvi
Mandvi
Mandvi is a Security Reporter covering data breaches, malware, cyberattacks, data leaks, and more at Cyber Press.

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