Oracle PeopleSoft 0-Day RCE Flaw Under Active Exploitation by ShinyHunters

Mandiant and Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) have issued an urgent warning about an active exploitation campaign targeting Oracle PeopleSoft infrastructure.

The threat actor behind the campaign, tracked as UNC6240 and publicly known as ShinyHunters, exploited a critical zero-day remote code execution vulnerability, CVE-2026-35273 (CVSS 9.8), before Oracle published its security advisory on June 10, 2026, making every successful intrusion during the campaign window a zero-day attack.

Active exploitation was observed between May 27 and June 9, 2026, targeting the Environment Management Hub (PSEMHUB) endpoints within Oracle PeopleSoft’s Environment Management component.

Oracle PeopleSoft 0-Day RCE Flaw

GTIG notified over 100 global organizations whose IP addresses correlated with potentially vulnerable endpoints. Approximately 68 percent of affected organizations were higher education institutions, including universities and colleges, primarily based in the U.S.

The campaign came to light after security researcher @nahamike01 on X disclosed open attacker directories on staging servers, enabling GTIG to perform detailed triage of ShinyHunters’ operational infrastructure.

ShinyHunters stood up staging infrastructure across five sequential IP addresses 142.11.200.186 through 142.11.200.190 running Python SimpleHTTP servers on port 8888 to host payloads and tooling.

ShinyHunters DLS Post showing Peoplesoft victim added. (Source: google)
ShinyHunters DLS Post showing Peoplesoft victim added. (Source: Google)

The attackers deployed customized MeshCentral remote management agents disguised as legitimate Microsoft Azure services.

The agent binaries meshagent32-azure-ops.exe, meshagent64-azure-ops.exe, and meshagent64-v2.exe were hardcoded to beacon to the C2 server at wss://azurenetfiles.net:443/agent.ashx.

The domain deliberately mimics Microsoft Azure NetApp Files to evade detection. MeshCentral setup began on May 27, 2026, at 22:14 UTC, with SSL certificate automation via acme-client following at 22:25 UTC.

Using MeshCentral’s CLI utility meshctrl.js, the attackers executed reconnaissance commands on compromised hosts, mapping Oracle PeopleSoft configurations by reading psappsrv.cfg, inspecting WebLogic config.xml files, and enumerating internal mount points and /etc/hosts entries.

Once inside victim environments, ShinyHunters deployed a custom propagation script [victim_abbreviation]_fanout.sh that automated SSH credential spraying against internal PeopleSoft nodes parsed from /etc/hosts.

GTIG stated that upon successful authentication, the script planted an extortion marker file named README-IF-YOU-SEE-THIS-YOUVE-BEEN-HACKED.TXT in WebLogic and Process Scheduler directories.

Exfiltrated data was compressed using zstd before the attackers concluded operations by establishing an SSH connection to 176.120.22.24, the public mirror of the ShinyHunters Data Leak Site. Stolen data from multiple victims was published to the DLS on June 9, 2026.

Oracle recommends disabling the Environment Management Hub (EMHub) service in multi-server configurations or removing the PSEMHUB application entirely in single-server deployments.

Organizations that cannot disable EMHub should immediately block external access to /PSEMHUB/* and /PSIGW/HttpListeningConnector at the firewall or network perimeter. Relying solely on WAF body-inspection rules is insufficient, as these controls can be bypassed.

Security teams should audit PIA WebLogic access logs for POST requests to /PSEMHUB/hub from external IPs, scan the PSEMHUB.war/ directory for unauthorized .jsp webshells, and monitor outbound SMB traffic (TCP 445) from PeopleSoft servers as a sign of potential NetNTLM hash coercion.

Unexpected directories named logs, persistantstorage, or scratchpad under PSEMHUB, paths should be treated as compromise indicators.

IndicatorTypeCategoryDescriptionSHA-256 Hash
142.11.200.186IP AddressStaging & C2 NetworkAttacker staging serverN/A
142.11.200.187IP AddressStaging & C2 NetworkAttacker staging serverN/A
142.11.200.188IP AddressStaging & C2 NetworkAttacker staging serverN/A
142.11.200.189IP AddressStaging & C2 NetworkAttacker staging serverN/A
142.11.200.190IP AddressStaging & C2 NetworkAttacker staging serverN/A
azurenetfiles.netDomainStaging & C2 NetworkC2 masquerading as Microsoft Azure NetApp FilesN/A
.bash_historyFile HashStaging PayloadAttacker command history2ab684d93c1553fad87041b4dea97188a97e78589deee2a7bacff905564f3a35
meshagent64-azure-ops.exeFile HashStaging PayloadPre-configured Windows agentf02a924c9ff92a8780ce812511341182c6b509d45bc59f3f7b522e37225d24fc
meshagent64-v2.exeFile HashStaging PayloadPre-configured Windows agentd83fdb9e53c5ff03c4cb0451ea1bebd79b53f29eadc1e2fa394c7af13a86ce2f
meshagent32-azure-ops.exeFile HashStaging PayloadPre-configured Windows agentc7e9332731b06644fc73e0046a2a89eaa59b09f54250e9bd622467187351711f
meshagentFile HashStaging PayloadUnconfigured Linux agent68257a6f9ff196179ec03624e849927f26599eb180a7c82e14ef5bc4e93bc309
README-IF-YOU-SEE-THIS-YOUVE-BEEN-HACKED.TXTFilenameAttacker ArtifactDefacement/extortion markerN/A
[victim_abbreviation]fanout.shFilenameAttacker ArtifactLateral movement propagation scriptN/A

Note: IP addresses and domains are intentionally defanged (e.g., [.]) to prevent accidental resolution or hyperlinking. Re-fang only within controlled threat intelligence platforms such as MISP, VirusTotal, or your SIEM.

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Tamilselvan
Tamilselvanhttps://cyberpress.org/
Tamilselvan is an Investigative cybersecurity journalist dedicated to breaking stories on ransomware cartels, data breaches, and state-sponsored espionage.

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