New PureRAT Campaign Uses PNG Files To Conceal Fileless Payloads

Researchers at the Trellix Advanced Research Center have uncovered a sophisticated PureRAT campaign that weaponizes innocent-looking PNG image files to secretly deliver fully fileless malware payloads, bypassing conventional endpoint defenses through a complex, multi-stage infection chain.

The campaign demonstrates how advanced threat actors are blending steganography, in-memory execution, and living-off-the-land techniques to evade detection at every step of the attack.

A Multi-Stage Infection Chain Beginning With a Simple Shortcut

The attack begins deceptively simply a malicious Windows shortcut (.LNK) file triggers a hidden PowerShell command that downloads a heavily obfuscated VBS loader from the actor-controlled domain hxxps://crixup[.]com. This VBScript loader is the engine of the infection.

It copies itself to C:\Users\Public\Downloads\ under a randomized filename, then uses Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to silently launch a new hidden process with ShowWindow = 0, making it completely invisible to the victim.

To ensure it survives reboots, the script registers a Windows Task Scheduler entry that runs every minute indefinitely, ensuring continuous execution on the compromised host.

After de-obfuscation, what appears to be a junk data array in the VBScript is revealed to be a fully functional embedded PowerShell script the next stage of the attack.

Infection chain (Source: trellix)
Infection chain (Source: trellix)

That PowerShell loader attempts to connect to the same C2 domain and downloads two PNG image files: 0xptimized_MSI.png and GeneratedPay.png.

These are not ordinary images. Encoded within unique delimiter strings in the PNG files are Base64-Encrypted, reversed, and character-substituted malicious PE files a classic steganography technique designed to slip past signature-based detection tools.

Process tree (Source: trellix)
Process tree (Source: trellix)

Once the payload is extracted from the PNG, it is loaded directly into PowerShell memory using [System.Reflection.Assembly]:: Load(), never touching the disk.

This fileless execution technique is the campaign’s defining characteristic, rendering traditional file-scanning defenses largely ineffective.

UAC Bypass, Anti-VM Checks, and Process Hollowing Into Msbuild.exe

To escalate privileges without alerting the Trellix user, the malware performs a UAC bypass via the legitimate Windows binary cmstp.exe.

Connected domain (Source: trellix)
Connected domain (Source: trellix)

It generates a temporary .inf configuration file containing a PowerShell command that turns off all UAC prompts by modifying the HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System registry key.

It then launches cmstp.exe /au and programmatically sends an Enter keypress to the resulting elevation dialog using Windows API calls fully automating the privilege escalation without any user interaction.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

TypeValue
SHA256 (.LNK)7d22c61e8aafc9a2a812cafe7720922ab12d770e5af7d92527d9b0dbd6e10f30
SHA256 (VBS Loader)96b4713c6b9e5283f9d2f570a51edce66fc44ced2ae130b65dbe1326690a27eb
SHA256 (0xptimized_MSI.png)40bd37eba7f9a56516c96092d5c6d50937fc4df00baf79155ada9d1673389830
SHA256 (GeneratedPay.png)121ae6c664aaef9ed2e44ed04c66e1cabcb00295c48289afd9e23126fc6edadf

Security teams are advised to monitor for unauthorized scheduled task creation, restrict execution of VBS and PowerShell scripts via execution policy controls, and block the listed C2 indicators at the network perimeter.

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Varshini
Varshini
Varshini is a Cyber Security expert in Threat Analysis, Vulnerability Assessment, and Research. Passionate about staying ahead of emerging Threats and Technologies..

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