Trail of Bits security researchers Alan Cao and Will Tan have demonstrated significant vulnerabilities in abandoned network hardware by successfully exploiting two discontinued home security devices at DistrictCon’s inaugural Junkyard competition in February 2025, earning runner-up recognition for their innovative exploitation techniques.
Their research underscores a growing cybersecurity concern: end-of-life hardware creates persistent attack vectors that remain unpatched indefinitely.
Competition Success Reveals Broader Security Implications
The researchers targeted two popular home network security devices that their manufacturers had discontinued: a Netgear WGR614v9 router and a BitDefender Box V1.
Both devices were originally designed to protect home networks, but became security liabilities once manufacturer support ended.
Trail of Bits, known for its extensive conference participation and security research, demonstrated complete remote exploitation of both devices from within the local network.
The timing of this revelation is particularly significant as DistrictCon has announced its second Junkyard competition for early 2026, potentially inspiring additional research into vulnerable legacy hardware.
The researchers have made their complete technical analysis publicly available through Trail of Bits’ exploits repository, providing detailed documentation for the cybersecurity community.
Technical Exploitation Details
For the Netgear router exploitation, the team developed three distinct attack methods targeting the device’s Universal Plug and Play (UPnP) daemon.
Their approach combined multiple vulnerabilities, including authentication bypass, buffer overflows, and command injection, to achieve remote root access.
One particularly innovative technique, dubbed “bashsledding,” represented a novel variation of traditional nopsled attacks by using shell command syntax rather than CPU instructions.
The BitDefender Box exploitation proved equally concerning, as the researchers compromised a device specifically marketed as a security appliance.
They discovered an unauthenticated firmware downgrade vulnerability combined with command injection flaws in the firmware validation process.
This attack chain allowed them to revert the device to older, more vulnerable firmware versions before exploiting previously patched security holes.
Industry-Wide Implications
The research highlights critical gaps in Internet of Things (IoT) device security lifecycle management.
When manufacturers discontinue products and cease security updates, existing vulnerabilities become permanently exploitable.
This creates what researchers describe as “fossils” of security flaws that attackers can reliably target.
The findings extend beyond individual device vulnerabilities to reveal systemic issues in how the technology industry handles product lifecycle security.
UPnP implementation flaws affect numerous manufacturers, while inadequate firmware update mechanisms represent widespread security architecture problems across the IoT ecosystem.
For consumers, this research emphasizes the importance of evaluating manufacturer support commitments before purchasing connected devices and considering open-source firmware alternatives where available.
The cybersecurity community benefits from competitions like Junkyard, which provide accessible venues for researchers to develop skills while highlighting real-world security challenges in legacy hardware that remains deployed in millions of homes and businesses worldwide.
Find this Story Interesting! Follow us on LinkedIn and X to Get More Instant Updates
%20(1).webp?resize=1600,900&ssl=1&description=Their research underscores a growing cybersecurity concern: end-of-life hardware creates persistent attack vectors that remain unpatched indefinitely.){kind=link}