Russian COLDRIVER Hackers Use LOSTKEYS Malware to Exfiltrate Sensitive Data

The Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) has unveiled a new malware campaign orchestrated by the Russian state-aligned threat actor COLDRIVER (also known as UNC4057, Star Blizzard, and Callisto).

This campaign leverages a novel malware variant named LOSTKEYS, marking a significant evolution in the group’s offensive cyber capabilities.

The malware was observed in active deployments in January, March, and April 2025, targeting a spectrum of high-profile entities, including NATO governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), former diplomats, and individuals connected to Western military and policy circles.

Infection Chain and Evasion Techniques

The attack chain is initiated through a social engineering-driven lure: a bogus CAPTCHA webpage.

COLDRIVER Hackers
Stage 1

Upon “solving” the CAPTCHA, the website presents malicious PowerShell code to the victim’s clipboard, instructing them to execute the code using Windows’ “run” dialog-a tactic known as “ClickFix.”

This manual execution requirement is a clever evasion of automated email and browser sandboxing defenses, and reflects a broader industry trend among advanced persistent threat (APT) actors.

The initial PowerShell code fetches a second-stage script, frequently delivered from the IP address 165.227.148[.]68.

This intermediary leverages display resolution-based checks to evade sandbox environments and virtual machines by calculating the MD5 hash of the system’s display resolution; if this matches a predefined set, execution is aborted.

A unique identifier, varying per infection chain, is required to progress to subsequent stages.

The third stage consists of a Base64-encoded payload containing further PowerShell, which retrieves two additional files from the attacker-controlled infrastructure: a Visual Basic Script (VBS) decoder and an encoded payload.

COLDRIVER Hackers
LOSTKEYS PAYLOAD DELIVERY

Decryption is handled using a pair of unique keys, each specific to the infection chain, and a substitution cipher, making static analysis and bulk decryption impractical.

The decoder reconstructs the final stage-the LOSTKEYS malware-from the encrypted payload.

LOSTKEYS Malware Capabilities

LOSTKEYS, implemented as a VBS script, is engineered to harvest files from targeted directories, based on a hard-coded list of file extensions.

It also exfiltrates system metadata and enumerates running processes, funneling this data back to attacker-controlled command and control (C2) servers.

While COLDRIVER’s historical focus has been credential phishing-often targeting the personal or NGO-affiliated emails of influential Westerners-LOSTKEYS represents a tactical expansion towards direct endpoint compromise for in-depth intelligence collection.

For select high-value targets, COLDRIVER has previously deployed other custom malware, such as SPICA, to gain deeper access to document stores.

These activities have included campaigns specifically targeting individuals linked to Ukraine, journalists, and think tanks, and have been associated with occasional hack-and-leak operations.

Recent findings reveal two December 2023 malware samples masquerading as Maltego installers, which also dropped LOSTKEYS, though attribution to COLDRIVER remains inconclusive.

In response to these findings, Google has updated its Safe Browsing service to block identified malicious domains and files, and has issued government-backed threat alerts to affected Gmail and Workspace users.

Potential targets are strongly advised to enroll in Google’s Advanced Protection Program, activate Enhanced Safe Browsing, and ensure all software is up to date.

Security professionals are encouraged to review the provided YARA rules and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to bolster detection and incident response capabilities.

Indicators of Compromise (IOC) Table

IOC (Hash/Domain/IP)Notes
13f7599c94b9d4b028ce02397717a128Stage 1 – Fake CAPTCHA page, loads PowerShell
2a46f07b9d3e2f8f2b3213fa8884b029Stage 1 – Fake CAPTCHA page, loads PowerShell
4c7accba35edd646584bb5a40ab78f96Stage 2: Device evasion and stage 3 loader
3de45e5fc816e62022cd7ab1b01dae9cStage 2: Device evasion and stage 3 loader
6b85d707c23d68f9518e757cc97adb20Stage 3: Retrieve and decode final payload, contains key
adc8accb33d0d68faf1d8d56d7840816Stage 3: Retrieve and decode final payload, contains key
3233668d2e4a80b17e6357177b53539dDecoder script, contains key
f659e55e06ba49777d0d5171f27565ddDecoder script, contains key
6bc411d562456079a8f1e38f3473c33aFinal payload, encoded
de73b08c7518861699e9863540b64f9aFinal payload, encoded
28a0596b9c62b7b7aca9cac2a07b0671Final payload, decoded
09f27d327581a60e8cb4fab92f8f4fa9Final payload, decoded
165.227.148[.]68C2
cloudmediaportal[.]comC2
b55cdce773bc77ee46b503dbd9430828Binary (Dec 2023) executes LOSTKEYS
cc0f518b94289fbfa70b5fbb02ab1847Binary (Dec 2023) executes LOSTKEYS
02ce477a07681ee1671c7164c9cc847bBinary (Dec 2023) executes LOSTKEYS
01c2e1cd50e709f7e861eaab89c69b6fBinary (Dec 2023) executes LOSTKEYS
8af28bb7e8e2f663d4b797bf3ddbee7fLOSTKEYS (Dec 2023)
0a33f637a33df9b31fbb4c1ce71b2feeLOSTKEYS (Dec 2023)
njala[.]devC2 from December 2023
80.66.88[.]67C2 from December 2023

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Mandvi
Mandvi
Mandvi is a Security Reporter covering data breaches, malware, cyberattacks, data leaks, and more at Cyber Press.

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