A newly discovered zero-day vulnerability in the Signaling System 7 (SS7) telecommunications protocol is being sold on underground forums for $5,000, posing unprecedented risks to global mobile network security.
According to the post from Dark Web Informer, the exploit package enables SMS hijacking, real-time phone tracking, and call interception through fundamental flaws in legacy telecom infrastructure.

Exploit Specifications
Vulnerability: SS7 Gateway 0day (CVE-2025-XXXXX pending assignment)
Attack Vector: Mobile Application Part (MAP) protocol weaknesses
Price: $5,000 USD (cryptocurrency only)
Package Includes:
- Zero-day payload exploiting UpdateLocation/AnyTimeInterrogation messages
- Curated list of 1,200+ vulnerable SS7 gateway IP addresses
- Automated dorking tools for Shodan, Censys, Fofa, Google, and ZMap
- Documentation detailing bypass techniques for Carrier-Grade NAT (CGNAT)
Technical Mechanism
The attack exploits three critical SS7 components:
1. MAP Protocol Flaws
Attackers manipulate UpdateLocation (UL) and AnyTimeInterrogation (ATI) messages to redirect SMS delivery paths and extract location data from Home Location Registers (HLRs).
The exploit uses modified Transaction Capabilities Application Part (TCAP) packets with spoofed Originating Point Codes (OPCs) to bypass signaling firewalls.
2. Point Code Spoofing
By forging valid OPCs (e.g., 244-011-001 format), attackers masquerade as legitimate Mobile Switching Centers (MSCs) to inject malicious Signaling Connection Control Part (SCCP) messages into the network.
3. Shodan Dorking Payload
The included toolset uses advanced search operators like:SS7 net:"ASXXXXX" port:2905 "SCCP Service"
to identify vulnerable SS7-over-IP (SIGTRAN) implementations exposed to public networks.
Attack Workflow
- Reconnaissance: Use dorking tools to locate SS7 gateways with open SIGTRAN ports (2905/TCP)
- Impersonation: Spoof legitimate OPCs using SS7 point code generators
- Payload Delivery: Inject malicious MAP messages via TCAP transactions
- Persistence: Establish shadow Visitor Location Registers (VLRs) to maintain access
Observed Impacts
- SMS Interception: Full capture of SMS-PP (Short Message Service Point-to-Point) messages, including 2FA codes
- Location Leakage: Real-time tracking via ATI queries to HLRs with ±50 meter accuracy
- Call Redirection: Unauthorized call forwarding using SendRoutingInfoForSM (SRI-SM) exploits
- Fraud Enablement: SIM swap attacks bypassing GSMA IR.21 security controls
Attack Type | Technical Implementation | Risk Level |
---|---|---|
SMS Hijacking | MAP-ForwardSM message manipulation | Critical |
Location Tracking | ATI-Request with spoofed OPC | High |
Call Eavesdropping | ISUP Initial Address Message (IAM) hijack | Medium |
Mitigation Strategies
- Network Segmentation: Implement SS7 Firewalls with SCCP message validation (e.g., Symsoft, AdaptiveMobile)
- Diameter Migration: Accelerate transition to 5G core networks using Security Protocol (SEPRO)
- Signal Monitoring: Deploy real-time SS7 intrusion detection systems with AI/ML anomaly detection
- Access Control: Enforce strict whitelisting for Global Title Translation (GTT) routing
Telecom operators are advised to audit their SS7 gateways for exposure to SIGTRAN interfaces and monitor for anomalous MAP message volumes exceeding 50 transactions/second.
While 5G networks reduce SS7 dependency through HTTP/2-based service-based architecture (SBA), the continued use of 2G/3G fallback mechanisms maintains critical attack surfaces.
This exploit’s appearance on darknet markets underscores the urgent need for legacy protocol modernization.
With SS7 handling over 8 billion SMS messages daily globally, the potential for mass-scale compromise remains acute until full transition to quantum-resistant 5G security frameworks is achieved.
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