Threat actors are rewriting the rulebook on mobile malware. Instead of simply building entirely new malicious tools, hackers are drastically re-engineering older threats to be virtually undetectable.
A highly stealthy new variant of the TrickMo Android banking trojan has emerged, actively targeting banking, fintech, and crypto wallet users across France, Italy, and Austria.
By completely abandoning the conventional internet for its command-and-control (C2) operations, this latest variant transforms infected devices into programmable network proxies.
TrickMo has evolved from a simple banking trojan into a sophisticated, remote-controlled foothold that bypasses modern security perimeters.
TrickMo Targets Crypto Banking
The most alarming architectural shift in the new TrickMo variant is its migration to The Open Network (TON). While TON is a legitimate decentralized networking platform, TrickMo’s operators are actively abusing it to hide their tracks.
The malware uses an embedded TON proxy to route its C2 traffic through opaque .adnl endpoints. This effectively neutralizes traditional domain takedowns and makes the malware’s traffic indistinguishable from legitimate TON applications.

Once a victim grants accessibility permissions often coerced through deceptive prompts the malware achieves full Device Take Over (DTO).
Attackers gain a real-time interactive view of the device, allowing them to steal credentials via fake banking overlays, log keystrokes, and intercept one-time passwords (OTPs).
Beyond data theft, this new variant turns the infected Android device into a weaponized network node.

Through newly added SSH tunneling and authenticated SOCKS5 proxying, attackers can route their own malicious traffic through the victim’s phone.
Because outbound traffic appears to originate from the victim’s legitimate home or corporate IP address, it easily bypasses IP-based fraud-detection heuristics used by banks and crypto exchanges.

According to Threat Fabric research, security researchers also note that the malware is stockpiling capabilities for future attacks.
The codebase includes dormant code for the Pine method-hooking framework and extensive Near Field Communication (NFC) permissions that are declared but not yet used, suggesting that operators are quietly preparing for future runtime updates.
Indicators of Compromise
Security teams and defenders should monitor their environments for the following hashes associated with the TrickMo dropper, host applications, and malicious modules:
| SHA-256 Hash | Package Name | Application Name | Role |
|---|---|---|---|
01889a9ec2abecb73e5e8792be68a4e3bc7dcbe1c3f19ac06763682d63aa8c21 | com.app16330.core20461 | TikTokApp18+ | Trickmo Dropper |
177ef86c57c31b29850227dbc8288b735bea977587f2f0a49cfc4089a644a2c4 | com.app15318.core1173 | TikTokApp18+ | Trickmo Dropper |
e2e218ddf698b4c0099fd2a9619d6912a71f75beb51669a4e3ae4fc71f745d03 | uncle.collop416.wifekin78 | Google Play Services | Trickmo Host application |
Note: IP addresses and domains are intentionally defanged (e.g., [.]) to prevent accidental resolution or hyperlinking. Re-fang only within controlled threat intelligence platforms such as MISP, VirusTotal, or your SIEM.
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