UNG0002 Attacks Organizations with Weaponized LNK Files and Tools like Cobalt Strike and Metasploit

Seqrite Labs APT-Team has recently unraveled the covert operations of a previously undocumented threat cluster tracked as UNG0002 (Unknown Group 0002), which has launched a series of sophisticated, espionage-focused attacks across China, Hong Kong, Pakistan, and other Asian jurisdictions.

Detailed research highlights the group’s robust preference for leveraging malicious shortcut (LNK) files, VBScript, batch and PowerShell scripts to deploy an evolving arsenal of remote access tools (RATs) and post-exploitation frameworks including Cobalt Strike and Metasploit.

Dual-Campaign Evolution

UNG0002’s operations have been characterized by continuous technical progression, evident across two major campaigns: Operation Cobalt Whisper (May–September 2024) and Operation AmberMist (January–May 2025).

The former campaign primarily targeted critical sectors like defense, electrotechnical engineering, and civil aviation, utilizing a multi-stage infection process where LNK files and VBScript initiated payload drops.

Weaponized LNK Files
Attack chain

In this phase, researchers observed as many as 20 unique infection chains, all featuring decoy curriculum vitae documents tailored to industry-specific interests as social engineering bait.

By early 2025, Operation AmberMist marked a strategic shift in target profile toward the gaming industry, software development, and academic institutions, introducing more lightweight, sophisticated implants including Shadow RAT, INET RAT, and Blister DLL Implant.

The attackers have also innovated their initial infection vectors, notably with the “ClickFix Technique,” using fake CAPTCHA verification pages sometimes mimicking Pakistan’s Ministry of Maritime Affairs website to entice users into running malicious PowerShell commands.

UNG0002 continued its propensity for abusing DLL sideloading techniques, employing legitimate Windows applications such as Rasphone and Node-Webkit to stealthily load malicious code while evading detection technologies.

Technical Sophistication

Technically, UNG0002 displays high adaptability and awareness of modern enterprise defense mechanisms.

Their campaigns consistently employ scripting languages (VBS, batch, PowerShell) and non-PE artifacts as loaders and droppers, paired with custom and commodity post-exploitation tools.

A notable aspect of their methodology is the deployment of encrypted shellcode blobs and tailored C2 configurations, making detection and attribution a challenge.

UNG0002’s infrastructure exhibits a persistent operational security discipline, with consistent naming conventions and layered delivery mechanisms that have remained stable across both major campaigns.

Furthermore, public analysis of malware artifacts has uncovered developer traces such as PDB paths (e.g., “C:\Users\The Freelancer\source\repos\JAN25\mustang\x64\Release\mustang.pdb”) suggesting nicknames like “Mustang” and “ShockWave”—a subtle sign of strategic mimicry, potentially designed to obfuscate attribution and imitate other threat actors’ playbooks.

Attribution remains complex, although Seqrite Labs assesses with high confidence that UNG0002 originates from the South-East Asia region, focusing on classic espionage and intelligence-gathering operations.

The group’s blend of genuine-seeming resumes (including fake tech and design professionals from prestigious institutions), sophisticated multi-stage attacks, and mimicry of rival actor techniques underline their operational maturity.

Persistently targeting organizations in defense, energy, civil aviation, academia, and gaming, the group evidences a calculated approach to regional intelligence collection.

Ongoing monitoring reveals UNG0002 as a highly adaptable adversary, likely to continue morphing its tradecraft as more intelligence surfaces.

Organizations operating in affected regions or sectors should remain vigilant, incorporating the latest IOCs and behavioral indicators into their security posture.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

CategoryFile TypeHash (SHA-256)Notes
Script-BasedLNK4ca4f673e4389a352854f5feb0793dac43519ade8049b5dd9356d0cbe0f06148Infection vector
Script-BasedLNK55dc772d1b59c387b5f33428d5167437dc2d6e2423765f4080ee3b6a04947ae9Infection vector
Script-BasedLNK4b410c47465359ef40d470c9286fb980e656698c4ee4d969c86c84fbd012af0dInfection vector
Script-BasedSCTc49e9b556d271a853449ec915e4a929f5fa7ae04da4dc714c220ed0d703a36f7Scriptlet
Script-BasedVBSad97b1c79735b1b97c4c4432cacac2fce6316889eafb41a0d97f2b0e565ee850VBScript loader
Script-BasedVBSc722651d72c47e224007c2111e0489a028521ccdf5331c92e6cd9cfe07076918VBScript loader
Script-BasedVBS2140adec9cde046b35634e93b83da4cc9a8aa0a71c21e32ba1dce2742314e8dcVBScript loader
Script-BasedBATa31d742d7e36fefed01971d8cba827c71e69d59167e080d2f551210c85fddaa5Batch dropper
Script-BasedPS1a31d742d7e36fefed01971d8cba827c71e69d59167e080d2f551210c85fddaa5PowerShell dropper
Script-BasedTXT2df309018ab935c47306b06ebf5700dcf790fff7cebabfb99274fe867042ecf0C2 config
Script-BasedTXTb7f1d82fb80e02b9ebe955e8f061f31dc60f7513d1f9ad0a831407c1ba0df87eC2 config
Script-BasedDAT2c700126b22ea8b22b8b05c2da05de79df4ab7db9f88267316530fa662b4db2cEncrypted shellcode
PEDLLc3ccfe415c3d3b89bde029669f42b7f04df72ad2da4bd15d82495b58ebde46d6Blister DLL, sideloaded
PEDLL4c79934beb1ea19f17e39fd1946158d3dd7d075aa29d8cd259834f8cd7e04ef8Blister DLL, variant
PEEXE2bdd086a5fce1f32ea41be86febfb4be7782c997cfcb028d2f58fee5dd4b0f8aINET RAT
PEEXE90c9e0ee1d74b596a0acf1e04b41c2c5f15d16b2acd39d3dc8f90b071888ac99Shadow RAT

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Mandvi
Mandvi
Mandvi is a Security Reporter covering data breaches, malware, cyberattacks, data leaks, and more at Cyber Press.

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