A critical remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability in Weaver (Fanwei) E-cology is being actively exploited in real-world attacks, exposing enterprise environments to full system compromise.
Tracked as CVE-2026-22679 with a CVSS score of 9.8, the flaw allows unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary commands on vulnerable systems.
Vulnerability Details
The issue affects Weaver E-cology 10.0 builds before 20260312. It exists in an exposed debug endpoint:
POST /papi/esearch/data/devops/dubboApi/debug/method
The vulnerability stems from improper handling of user-supplied JSON parameters, specifically interfaceName and methodName.
These inputs are passed directly into the Dubbo RPC framework without authentication or validation, enabling attackers to invoke internal methods that lead to OS command execution.
Public proof-of-concept (PoC) exploits demonstrate that attackers can use values like:
- interfaceName: com.weaver.rpc.InvokeCommand
- methodName: executeCommand
This results in command execution via the application’s Java Virtual Machine (JVM), which runs under Tomcat.
The vendor patched the issue on March 12, 2026, by removing the vulnerable debug endpoint entirely.
However, exploitation had already begun in the wild before public disclosure.
Threat intelligence from Vega Research and Shadowserver indicates attacks began as early as March 17, 2026.
A confirmed intrusion campaign targeted an internet-facing Windows server running an unpatched version of Weaver.
All malicious activity originated from java.exe, confirming the RCE vulnerability as the primary entry point.
- Phase 1 – RCE Verification: Attackers used ping.exe callbacks to 152.32.173[.]138 to confirm command execution. The endpoint returned output in HTTP responses, eliminating the need for an interactive shell.
- Phase 2 – Payload Delivery: PowerShell download attempts retrieved payloads such as vsgbt.exe and hjchhb.exe. These were blocked by endpoint defenses. One payload was disguised as nvm.exe using Base64-encoded commands.
- Phase 3 – MSI Deployment: Attackers attempted to deploy fanwei0324.msi via msiexec.exe, but execution failed, likely due to errors in the package.
- Phase 4 – Evasion Techniques: The attacker renamed powershell.exe to 2.txt and used obfuscated scripts to download payloads (xx.ps1, x.ps1) from 132.243.172[.]2 using in-memory execution (DownloadString and IEX), avoiding disk artifacts.
Organizations using Weaver E-cology should act immediately:
- Upgrade to build 20260312 or later.
- Monitor for suspicious child processes spawned by java.exe, especially ping.exe, cmd.exe, and powershell.exe.
- Block outbound connections to known malicious IPs.
- Restrict internet exposure of OA systems.
- Review EDR logs for obfuscated PowerShell, renamed binaries, and fileless execution patterns.
This campaign highlights how quickly attackers weaponize newly discovered vulnerabilities. Even with patches available, delayed updates leave critical enterprise systems exposed to rapid exploitation.
Indicators of Compromise
Key infrastructure linked to the campaign includes:
- 205.209.116[.]54 – payload hosting
- 161.132.49[.]114 – config and payload delivery
- 141.11.89[.]42 – MSI hosting
- 132.243.172[.]2 – PowerShell scripts
- 152.32.173[.]138 – Goby callback server
Example malicious URLs include:
http://205.209.116[.]54:2013/vsgbt.exe
http://132.243.172[.]2/config/xx.ps1
A known hash:
fanwei0324.msi – 147ac3f24b2b63544d65070007888195a98d30e380f2d480edffb3f07a78377f
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