XwormRAT Operators Hide Malicious Code Within Legitimate Software for Stealthier Attacks

Security researchers at AhnLab Security Intelligence Center (ASEC) have identified a sophisticated malware campaign utilizing steganography techniques to distribute XwormRAT, a remote access trojan that poses significant threats to organizations and individuals alike.

This campaign represents a concerning evolution in malware distribution methods, demonstrating how cybercriminals are adapting their techniques to evade detection systems and deceive unsuspecting users.

Sophisticated Multi-Stage Attack Vector

The XwormRAT distribution campaign employs a complex multi-stage attack mechanism that begins with carefully crafted phishing emails.

The initial infection vector relies on VBScript and JavaScript components that are seamlessly integrated into legitimate code structures, making detection extremely challenging for both users and security systems.

This obfuscation technique allows the malicious scripts to operate undetected during the initial execution phase.

Phishing email body

Once the first-stage script executes, it deploys an embedded PowerShell script designed to establish communication with external command-and-control servers.

The PowerShell component contains Base64-encoded data mixed with dummy characters, creating an additional layer of obfuscation.

During runtime, the script employs the Replace() function to systematically remove these dummy characters before decoding and executing the actual malicious payload.

This process culminates in the download of a seemingly innocent JPG image file that contains both a .NET loader and the final XwormRAT malware.

Evolution of Steganographic Concealment Methods

The steganography technique employed in this campaign has undergone significant evolution, demonstrating the adaptability of cybercriminals.

Earlier versions of this attack method relied on encoding malicious data between specific delimiter strings (“<<BASE64_START>>” and “<<BASE64_END>>”) appended to JPG files.

The .NET loader would locate these delimiters and extract the encoded payload for execution.

However, the current variant represents a more sophisticated approach. Instead of using text-based delimiters, the malware now searches for bitmap image signatures (0x42, 0x4d, 0x46, 0xC0) embedded within the JPG file structure.

The .NET loader extracts RGB pixel values from this embedded bitmap data, decodes the color information, and reconstructs the malicious payload.

This technique makes detection significantly more challenging, as the malicious data is seamlessly integrated into legitimate image pixel data.

(Left) Script of the past version (Right) Script of the current version being distributed

Mitigations

According to the Report, The continuous evolution of this steganographic distribution method highlights the persistent nature of modern cyber threats.

The technique’s versatility allows it to distribute various malware families beyond XwormRAT, making it a particularly dangerous tool in cybercriminal arsenals.

To mitigate these threats, organizations and individuals should implement comprehensive security measures:

  • Exercise extreme caution when handling emails from unknown sources, particularly those containing image attachments.
  • Implement advanced threat detection systems capable of analyzing steganographic content and monitoring for suspicious PowerShell activity.
  • Conduct regular security awareness training emphasizing the risks associated with opening unsolicited email attachments.
  • Maintain updated security solutions and remain vigilant against evolving cyber threats.
  • Establish incident response procedures for potential steganographic malware infections.

The ongoing distribution of modified versions of this steganographic technique underscores the importance of maintaining updated security solutions and remaining vigilant against evolving cyber threats.

As cybercriminals continue to refine their methods, the cybersecurity community must adapt its defensive strategies accordingly.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs):

TypeValue
MD50e5ff18f30be0fcb3f3d9be61e7b1eb9
MD519399e8df23b0b98e1fe830e72888f34
MD53cbb2ad896862aa551ee3010eee75a4a
MD5851460f488aca6b4da2f751f1899520e
MD5992fdbc2af1ef6a9ccae4f8661096f89
URLhttp[:]//paste[.]ee/d/YBaUs0Re/0
URLhttp[:]//paste[.]ee/d/l46VcUGG/0
URLhttps[:]//archive[.]org/download/wp4096799-lost-in-space-wallpapers_20250610/wp4096799-lost-in-space-wallpapers[.]jpg
URLhttps[:]//pub-a06eb79f0ebe4a6999bcc71a2227d8e3[.]r2[.]dev/cunny[.]txt
URLhttps[:]//pub-a06eb79f0ebe4a6999bcc71a2227d8e3[.]r2[.]dev/man[.]txt

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Kaaviya
Kaaviyahttps://cyberpress.org/
Kaaviya is a Security Editor and fellow reporter with Cyber Press. She is covering various cyber security incidents happening in the Cyber Space.

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